The political risk of terrorism : the value of "new terrorism" as a concept for analysis by Scott, Gregory Richard Jr
 
 
The Political Risk of Terrorism: 
The value of “new terrorism” as a concept for analysis  
 
By  
Gregory Richard Scott 
December 2010  
Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters 
of International Studies at the University of Stellenbosch  
Supervisor: Ms Derica Lambrechts 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
Department of Political Science 
 
 
i 
 
Declaration 
 
By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is 
my own, original work, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for 
obtaining any qualification. 
 
December 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2010 University of Stellenbosch 
 
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
This research paper offers an analysis of new terrorism as a concept for analysis in Political Risk. 
In order to assess the novelty and value of new terrorism it is juxtaposed with old terrorism. This 
analysis uses a historical comparative method in which three terrorist groups, within two distinct 
historical periods, are discussed and compared. The first historical period is 1945-2000 and 
assesses old terrorism through a descriptive assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Hezbollah. The second historical period, 2001-2009, provides a descriptive assessment of al-
Qaeda. The primary variables for analysis with regards to the terrorist groups selected herein are 
goals, targets and tactics. Also discussed is the secondary variable structure. 
A number of key findings indicate that there are more similarities than there are differences 
between old and new terrorism. The novelty and value of new terrorism is thus limited as a 
concept for analysis within Political Risk Analysis. The conclusion of this research paper 
establishes that for a normative conceptualisation of terrorism to exist, and have value, it must 
consider both old and new terrorism. This normative understanding of terrorism better serves the 
purpose of mitigation within the sphere of Political Risk Analysis.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie studie bied ‟n ontleding van nuwe terrorisme as ‟n begrip vir ontleding in Politieke 
Risiko. Ten einde die nuutheid en waarde van nuwe terrorisme te evalueer, word dit naas ou 
terrorisme gestel. Hierdie ontleding gebruik ‟n histories-vergelykende metode waarin drie 
terroristegroepe, in twee afsonderlike historiese tydperke, bespreek en vergelyk word. Die eerste 
historiese tydperk strek van 1945–2000 en evalueer ou terrorisme met behulp van ‟n 
beskrywende evaluering van die Moslem Broederskap en Hezbollah. Die tweede historiese 
tydperk, 2001–2009, bied ‟n beskrywende evaluering van al-Qaeda. Die primêre veranderlikes 
vir ontleding met betrekking tot die terroristegroepe wat hierin aangewys is, is doelstellings, 
teikens en taktiek. Verder word die sekondêre veranderlike struktuur bespreek. 
‟n Aantal belangrike bevindinge dui daarop dat daar meer ooreenkomste as verskille tussen ou en 
nuwe terrorisme bestaan. Die nuutheid en waarde van nuwe terrorisme het dus beperkinge vir 
ontleding as ‟n begrip in Politieke Risiko-ontleding. Die gevolgtrekking van hierdie studie dui 
dus daarop dat, vir ‟n normatiewe konseptualisering van terrorisme om te bestaan, en ook waarde 
te hê, dit beide ou en nuwe terrorisme in berekening moet bring. Hierdie normatiewe begrip van 
terrorisme dien die doel van tempering binne die sfeer van Politieke Risiko-ontleding beter.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction: 
Throughout history the concept of terrorism has gone through a number of changes. Its origin as 
a word can be traced back to the French Revolution in 1789. During this time the revolutionary 
leader Maximilien Robespierre referred to it as “nothing but justice, prompt, severe and 
inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue” (Innes and Fuller, 2002:9). It was however 
during the Reign of Terror
1
 (1793-1794) that terrorism began to resemble something other than 
the revolutionary verve of the common French people. During this time the revolutionary 
opponents (antigovernment activists) acting against the prevailing French regime were swiftly 
beheaded by the infamous guillotine. This pursuit of traitors culminated in some eleven thousand 
deaths at the hands of the state (Betts, 2000). It was thus that terror as an idea and concept came 
to represent the abuse of power by a government, or regime, against its people. 
  
In 1848, within the climate of popular uprisings throughout most of Europe, the revolutionary 
Italian, Carlo Pisacane, put forward the doctrine of “propaganda by deed,” arguing that violence 
is a necessary means to encourage public revolt as well as to educate the masses and gain their 
support (Innes and Fuller, 2002:10). This doctrine represents another conception of terrorism and 
it is argued by Innes and Fuller (2002:10) that this represents the justification behind more 
modern conceptions of terrorism – that is social actors acting against the state.  
 
During the 1930‟s and 1940‟s terrorism once again came to resemble the use of violence by 
governments against their citizens. Fascists in Germany, Italy and Spain all ruthlessly suppressed 
„enemies of the state.‟ In Russia, Stalin‟s “Great Terror” set about eliminating all those who 
challenged his power. However, just like in 1848, terrorism began to resemble something else 
after the end of World War II in 1945 (Innes and Fuller, 2002:18).  
 
In the post-war period Shughart (2006) argues that three identities or „stylized waves‟ of 
terrorism have emerged. These identities are captured by the left-wing terrorist groups like the 
                                                 
1
 The “Reign of Terror” was a period in the French Revolution characterised by numerous executions of supposed 
enemies of the state (Encylopedia.com, 2010). 
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Red Brigade
2
 in Italy, the national liberation movements like Irgun Zavi Le‟ umi3 in Palestine as 
well as Islamic fundamentalist groups with the Muslim Brotherhood
4
 representing one of the 
first.  
 
Whatever definition of terrorism one might adopt; many scholars, government analysts and 
politicians claim that since the mid 1990‟s terrorism has again changed into an inherently new 
concept. This new concept involves different actors, motivations, tactics, targets and actions, 
compared to the old concept of terrorism used in the mid twentieth century.
 
Since 9/11
5
 this, so-
called, new type of terrorism has greatly gained in prominence as it is characterised by the war 
on terrorism
6
. This is prevalent in a range of academic disciplines including Political Science, 
sociology and economics and without doubt has become a central issue throughout the world 
(Spencer, 2006: 4).  
  
This research study represents a critical reflection on the application of the concept of new 
terrorism as a concept in Political Risk Analysis (hereafter PRA). The concept of new terrorism 
will be analysed by researching the identity of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism within two 
historical frames of analysis. This will allow for the comparative analysis of old terrorism versus 
new terrorism. The relevance of such an undertaking is to aid PRA in correctly framing the 
concept of terrorism for analysis so that PRA can accurately forecast and mitigate against 
terrorism. 
1.2 Rationale for the Research Study: 
Underpinning the Islamic fundamentalist identity of terrorism is the conceptualisation of 
terrorism: terrorists are actors acting against the state or prevailing world order. In the post-1945 
                                                 
2
 The Red Brigades or Brigate Rosse was a Marxist-Leninist left wing terrorist group that operated in Italy during 
the 1970s and 1980s (Historyofwar.org). 
3
 Irgun Zavi Le‟ umi is a Jewish right wing nationalist underground movement founded in Palestine in 1931, and 
committed acts of terrorism against the British in whom it regarded as illegal occupiers of Palestine 
(Britannica.com). 
4
 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 as an Islamist revivalist movement over the decades since its start 
various break away groups have adopted its principles and adapted its methods – most notable is Hamas (Fas.org). 
5
 9/11 refers to September 11 2001 in which al-Qaeda; a well known Islamic fundamentalist group, al-Qaeda, 
executed a large scale terrorist attack on American soil which had an immediate cost of $100 billion in property 
damage and human life and up to a further $2 trillion damage in lower future corporate profit (Shughart, 2002:6). 
6The “war on terrorism” refers to the mitigation tactics of the USA against terrorism, including policy decisions 
related to terrorism and the much publicised wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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era terrorism has broadly come to mean the use of violence against non-combatant targets
7
 to 
achieve politically motivated goals (Office of the Coordination for Counterterrorism, 1997: vi). 
After 9/11 this definition has become even more entrenched allowing the post-war identity of 
Islamic fundamentalism to be analysed over time. The purpose of such an analysis is to challenge 
the so-called primacy that the war on terrorism places on new terrorism. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2005) the adjective „new‟ means „not existing before‟ or „discovered 
recently or now for the first time.‟  Therefore the concept of new terrorism implies that there is 
an old terrorism and that the differences between the two are significant. This research study will 
question the apparent „newness‟ of the concept new terrorism, by using a historical comparative 
framework of analysis to compare old and new terrorism. 
 
New terrorism as a concept argues that terrorists now operate transnationally, in loosely 
organised networks; that they are largely motivated by religious extremism; that they aim at mass 
casualties and attempt to obtain weapons of mass destruction for the targeting of indiscriminate 
victims (Hough, 2005: 2; Spencer, 2006: 9-11). This concept of new terrorism as discussed in 
Hough (2005:2) implies that Islamic fundamentalism (as a single terrorist identity), has in a 
significant way changed over time. By studying Islamic fundamentalism over time, and the 
specific concept of terrorism that defines it, significant changes can be exposed to either give 
weight to, or detract from, new terrorism as a concept for analysis as part of a political risk 
analysis. 
 
Regardless of more contemporary arguments about old terrorism versus new terrorism it can be 
argued that the fundamental decision-making processes that govern the organisational operations 
of each identity of terrorism have remained unchanged. That is, a terrorist identity contains 
rational actors (that make up the organisational structure), who make rational decisions with a 
goal to achieve desired outcomes.  By understanding the Islamic fundamentalist identity of 
terrorism and the terrorist actors that operate within them as rational (following a rational 
decision-making process) a better understanding of how terrorists operate and behave can be 
established. This is done by linking actions with desired consequences through the study of the 
primary variables goals, targets and tactics of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups.  
                                                 
7
 Non-combatant targets can include military personal that are not active in the field of duty. 
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In this research study the process of historical analysis and time based comparison within a 
rational framework will illustrate whether or not there is real value in the concept new terrorism, 
by locating significant and identifiable changes in terrorist behaviour and action, if any. The 
relevance of this study is located in the field of PRA in which rational actors behave in such a 
way as to utilise the PRA process to reduce loss and maximise profit through the assessment and 
mitigation of risk. In this field of study terrorism can be regarded as an important risk variable
8
 
for analysis for interested states and organisations; however, the introduction of the new 
terrorism concept poses a significant problem to the analysis of terrorism by casting what is 
perceived to be conceptually significant. This potentially undermines the analysis and mitigation 
process within PRA. This will now be elaborated on in the following section. 
1.3 Research Problem: 
PRA investigates certain variables and their respective indicators to deduce probabilities of risks 
occurring. The effectiveness of a political risk analysis lies in its ability to correctly and 
effectively frame the problem. As noted by Vertzberger (1998:33) “the framing of problems 
is…of great importance to their apprehension and to the search for solutions by decision-makers, 
but it is especially critical in dealing with political-military problems that are ill defined, 
complex, indeterminate, and wicked.” As a way to construct the frame of analysis of the concept 
terrorism PRA analyses the terrorist organisations membership, goals, tactics and environment to 
create a risk probability (Bremmer and Keat, 2009:105-114).  
 
For the purpose of this thesis these analytical categories have been reduced to three primary 
variables.  The first two are goals and tactics as those objectives that terrorists groups want to 
achieve and the means they use to achieve them respectively. The third variable that is added is 
targets, and refers to those structures, physical or human, that terrorists seek to destroy or 
influence on the path to attaining their goals. The reason these categories of analysis have been 
selected is because, as per the rational choice framework, rational decisions are consequential 
and preference-based (March, 1994:2). This means that given perceived consequences (goals), 
rational actors (terrorists) will favour certain tactics and targets (preferences) over others given 
constraints (mitigation strategies) and incentives. In spite of the selection of three primary 
                                                 
8Within the field of political risk some authors choose to use „variable‟ (Simon, 1982), while others use the word 
„factor‟ (Brink, 2004). These concepts are interchangeable however; „variable‟ will be used predominately herein. 
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variables this research remains open to the discovery of possible secondary variables for 
analysis. 
 
An alternative conception of terrorism (new terrorism) should reveal different goals, tactics and 
targets which can make the mitigation process confusing and haphazard. Spencer (2006:5) 
argues that a focus on new terrorism may justify a whole new set of rushed restrictive 
governmental counter-measures without these being democratically debated, publicly discussed, 
independently monitored or even necessary. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on new terrorism 
could lead to a neglect of other forms of terrorisms as represented by the identities not covered in 
this research study, but referred to by Shughart (2006:7): terrorism as national liberation 
movements and ethnic separatism as well as left-wing terrorism.   
 
Present literature by Shughart (2006:7) indicates that terrorism as a concept can be subdivided 
into three main identities: 1) terrorism as national liberation movements and ethnic separatism. 
2) left-wing terrorism, and 3) Islamic fundamentalism. These identities can be individually 
assessed in terms of their so-called „newness‟; however, for the purposes of this research study, 
the  Islamic fundamentalist identity will be analysed due to its direct relation to the war on terror 
and the concept of new terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism was selected because of the primacy 
that new terrorism places on religion and because the proper analysis of the remaining identities 
falls beyond the page limit in this research study. The remaining identities however can also be 
discussed within the framework of PRA, using similar methodological tools to make critical 
reflections on the concept new terrorism and without doubt present avenues for further study. 
 
Understanding the terrorism variable, and its subsequent identity, from within a single frame 
(new or not) can provide a richer picture of terrorism as a risk variable. PRA can thus provide 
details as to how terrorism changes over time and the decisions terrorists are likely to make 
which can in turn offer a degree of cost effectiveness to the mitigation process especially when 
such an analysis is conducted within a rational choice framework. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis will analyse the changing identity of Islamic fundamentalism in terms of 
their goals, tactics and targets over two distinct historical periods, the first being the post-war 
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period 1945 to 2000, and the second period being post-9/11 (2001) to 2009. This will provide 
evidence either for or against the concept new terrorism as well as provide a rich picture of 
Islamic terrorism throughout recent history. 
 
Before continuing however, terrorism has to be justified as a concept for analysis within PRA. 
Terrorism is justifiably a concept for analysis within PRA because terrorism generally has 
devastating effects on business enterprises and states alike. The estimated cost of terrorism 
according to Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) in their analysis of the tourist industry in a 
sample of European countries noted that Austria, Italy and Greece lost $4.583 Billion, $1.159 
Billion and $0.77 Billion respectively between 1974 and 1988. Similarly, terrorism in Spain for 
the period 1975-1991 is estimated to have reduced annual foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow 
by 13.5% on average, which translates into some $500 million (Frey et al, 2004:11).  
 
Apart from costs to industry and FDI there are a number of costs involved with the mitigation of 
terrorism thereof. According to Shubik and Zelinsky (2009:8) the 2006 estimated costs of the 
war on terrorism for the United States of America (USA) was $188 Billion with their defence 
budget exceeding the $527 Billion mark, 17% of this was allocated to terrorism. Coupled with 
financial costs to terrorism it is also relevant to note that there is a human cost to terrorism too. It 
is reported that incidences of terrorism in recent years are 17 percentage points more likely to 
result in casualties than in the 1970‟s (Enders and Sandler, 2002).  
 
In sum, to paraphrase Howell and Chaddick‟s (1994:71) definition of political risk terrorism 
represents a political/social decision, event or condition that affects the business environment 
such that investors lose money or have a reduced profit. 
 
When weighted against the cost of 9/11, the cost of the war on terrorism as a mitigation response 
appears overly excessive and ineffective. The lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the 
costs of maintaining a military theatre of action seems hardly a rational response to an event that 
cost the USA just over $2.1 Trillion, and approximately 3000 lives. In fact six times as many 
Americans were killed by drunk drivers in 2001 than by the 9/11 attacks (Richardson, 2006:183). 
One can also argue that the war on terror encourages extremist aggression against the USA 
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rather than mitigates it. When considering the words of Osama Bin Laden‟s second in command 
al-Zawahiri this becomes quite clear: 
 
“the masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the regimes [such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Jordan] to protect their interests and to fight the battle against the Muslims on their 
behalf...therefore we must move to the enemy‟s battle grounds to burn the hands of those who 
ignite fires in our countries” (Cited in Richardson, 2006: 129) 
 
This thesis therefore represents a rational response to terrorism as concept for analysis in 
Political Risk. In examining Islamic fundamentalist terrorism through rational analysis this 
research study will attempt to illustrate that: 1) new terrorism is not justifiably new and, 2) 
terrorism can be more holistically understood and therefore more effectively mitigated through a 
political risk analysis that adopts rational choice as a framework for analysis. 
 
Subsequently, terrorism as a risk variable is more valuable as an all encompassing variable that 
includes other identities of terrorism. This is favoured over a new variable that places value on a 
specific period or apparent trend.  
 
Accordingly the research herein will address a number of important questions. The main research 
question guiding this study is: Are the changes in Islamic fundamentalism (from 1945- 2000 and 
2001 - 2009) significant enough for the variable of “new terrorism” to have real value within 
Political Risk Analysis? Three sub-questions have also been identified to support the main 
research question. The first sub-question is: What is the old versus the new conceptualisation of 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism? This will serve to illustrate that new terrorism is not a 
meaningful concept for analysis since it provides too narrow a focus which can potentially hinder 
risk mitigation strategies within PRA. The second sub-question is: How does rational choice 
theory contribute to understanding terrorism as a PRA variable? This will establish the 
importance of the conceptualisation of terrorism as a rational act and reconcile it with the main 
goals of PRA.  The third and final sub-question is: How does rational choice theory reconcile the 
differences between old and new terrorism?  
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1.4 Research Design and Research Methods: 
In order to answer the questions posed above this study will analyse terrorism through the 
overarching theoretical framework of rational choice theory (e.g. Shughart, 2006; Pape, 2003; 
Frey et al, 2004; Richardson, 2006) as it exists in decision-making, political science and 
economics. The basis of this approach is grounded in the idea that terrorists and the organisations 
that they represent are deliberate actors whose behaviour can be modelled. Within this 
framework terrorists are assumed to be motivated primarily, yet not exclusively, by self-interest. 
 
Rational choice theory assumes decision processes are consequential and preference-based. 
“They are consequential in the sense that action depends on anticipations of future effects of 
current actions. Alternatives are interpreted in terms of their expected consequences. They are 
preference-based in the sense that consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences” 
(March, 1994:2). To add to these processes utility must be taken into account. Utility is broadly 
defined as a way to describe preferences (Varian, 2006:54), and in the case of rational actors, 
who are self-interested, a primary goal is to maximise utility – that is to achieve the highest 
possible preference outcome given a number of anticipated outcomes. 
 
In the case of terrorism, according to rational choice, terrorists want to maximise utility. This 
means that actions depend on expected payoffs to members as weighted against expected losses. 
Shughart (2006:11) notes that such payoffs might include wealth, power, fame, or patronage, as 
against losses like death, injury or imprisonment for example.  
 
The value of this model as it relates to the field of PRA is also important as political risk analysis 
at its most objective level relies on scientific method and rational choice to analytically forecast 
probable eventualities (Kobrin, 1979). The process of forecasting in PRA is more than simple 
prediction because it attempts to remove itself from the bias of personal value judgements. In 
keeping with the scientific method and rational choice PRA projects the certainty of past events 
into the outcomes of future events. This is done in such a way that the results, given fixed 
information, would remain unchanged when repeatedly tested and maximise utility for the 
enterprise that the model serves. Also, actors (organisational or state based) seek to maximise 
9 
 
utility in ways congruent to those described above and PRA represents a method to reduce loss 
and maximise profit. The very basis of PRA is grounded in rational choice. 
 
Within this overarching theoretical framework of rational choice this thesis will analyse the most 
fundamental changes to the Islamic fundamentalist identity of terrorism from the vantage point 
of two distinct historical periods.  
  
The first historical period is 1945 to 2000. This historical period begins at 1945 with the end of 
World War II and includes the period of decolonisation, the Iranian Revolution as well as the 
Cold War, up until 2000. Herein the following terrorist groups will be discussed: The Muslim 
Brotherhood and Hezbollah.  
 
The second historical frame is characterised by the post 9/11 “war against terrorism” (2001-
2009) and what the American 9/11 commission calls new terrorism which places primacy on the 
changing nature of Islamic fundamentalism
9
. The terrorist group for discussion herein is al-
Qaeda. 
 
Within each time series, Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations that make up the 
overarching identity will be evaluated on the basis of three primary
10
 variables, namely: goals, 
targets and tactics. Furthermore this will be done within a rational choice framework.  
 
Rationally terrorist‟s goals are shaped by their motives, preferences and perceived utility of 
success. Terrorists seek to exploit targets with high payoffs and low levels of expected losses; 
that is high levels of utility (given a range of goals) as achievable using available tactics (as 
shaped by constraints). The tactics they use are such that they inflict the most damage with the 
lowest possible level of reciprocal damage and do so with the overarching design to achieve their 
stated goals. Finally, terrorist tactics are shaped by constraints on their power to achieve their 
desired goals and implement appropriate tactics. To extrapolate such information about terrorist 
goals, targets and tactics the terrorist group or organisation must be examined. To this end the 
                                                 
9
 The concept new terrorism emerged in the mid-1990‟s however, it did not gain wide acceptance until after 9/11 
(Spencer, 2006: 9) 
10
 It must be noted that the research herein remains open to the discovery of possible secondary variables. 
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unit of analysis
11
 is thus the terrorist organisations that characterise the Islamic fundamentalist 
identity. Primary focus is given, though not limited to, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and 
al-Qaeda. 
 
This thesis represents a qualitative historical comparative analysis of the possible changes to a 
single identity of terrorism and the rational decision-making framework that underpins it within 
two historical time frames. In accordance with this type of analysis this thesis will use the 
method of difference. The method of difference (Neuman, 2006:473) requires a comparison 
between cases and analyses significant commonalities between cases as well as significant 
differences. In this case significant commonalities and differences will be observed and 
discussed between each organisation from a given historical period.  This method will allow 
further discussion to illustrate that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, as it exists post-9/11 is not 
new, and has remained largely the same. This method of observation and comparison is both 
exploratory and evaluative (Babbie and Mouton, 1998:76). 
  
This research is grounded in theory and in secondary sources. The use of primary sources in this 
context would present this author with a number of unnecessary dangers. Interviewing a terrorist 
or interacting with a terrorist organisation is not on the agenda. Thus all observations on the 
variable terrorism are constructed from the theoretical safety of academia. This means the 
research herein is obtained from journal articles, academic libraries and the internet. The 
secondary data herein is collected from a range of educational books, academic journals and 
sources in fields as diverse as economics, political science, and decision-making. Internet news 
sources will also be made use of, as journalists have more recently conducted a number of 
interviews with known terrorists and their organisations.  
1.5 Literature Review: 
The literature covered within this thesis will involve four key areas. The four areas are as 
follows: PRA and the rational choice framework; terrorism and new terrorism; Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism 1945-2000; and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 2001-2009.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 The unit of analysis is the unit, case or part of social life that is under consideration (Neuman, 2006:58). 
11 
 
1.5.1 Political Risk Analysis and the Rational Choice Framework: 
The rational choice framework will be discussed from within the field of decision-making using 
the work of March (2004), and Bray (2009) both of which will be used extensively. 
Supplementary information is provided by Caplan (2006) and Dixit and Skeath (2004). 
When conceptualising PRA key texts in the field will be used. Texts of notoriety include Brink‟s 
(2004) Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment as well as Kobrin (1979), Simon 
(1982, 1984) and Robock (1971). These texts will be consulted to conceptualise “political risk” 
as a field of analysis in which terrorism as a concept can be located. Notable examples of 
terrorism as a concept for analysis occur in Simon (1982, 1984, and 1987), as well as Alon and 
Martin (1998).  Bremmer and Keat‟s (2009) The Fat Tail also serves as a foundational text in 
this regard. 
  
With regard to the definition of rational choice and its application to terrorism texts by March 
(1994), Caplan (2006), Pape (2003) and Intriligator (2010) will be consulted. Enders and Sandler 
(2006, 2006a, 2005) represent some of the most intensive application of rational choice to 
terrorism, these authors also provide in depth statistical analysis of the changing nature of 
terrorism and the effects thereof within society.  
1.5.2 Terrorism and New Terrorism: 
The identity of terrorism contained herein is obtained from Shughart (2006) who refers to 
Islamic fundamentalism as a “stylised wave of terrorism” in his historical account from which 
the basis of this thesis is established. Authors used to define the concept of terrorism herein are 
Richardson (2006) and Enders and Sandler (2005; 2006; 2006a). Further definitional substance is 
added by Bremmer and Keat (2009). 
 
The concept of new terrorism is defined in Spencer‟s (2006) Questioning the Concept of New 
Terrorism. Tucker (2001) as well as Laquer (1996) also contributes to a foundation of what 
constitutes new terrorism. For a summary of the key attributes of new terrorism Hough (2005) 
provides an adequate synthesis. 
1.5.3 Islamic Fundamentalism 1945-2000:  
After terrorism is located within the field of political risk and rational choice, the first conceptual 
identity of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism will be historically established using the work of 
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Shughart (2006) who traces the history of this type of terrorism from 1945 until 2000. This 
analysis will be further bolstered by the work of Milton-Edwards (2005) entitled Islamic 
Fundamentalism Since 1945. This text provides a more thorough account of Islamic 
fundamentalism post-1945 with valuable coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and 
al-Qaeda. 
 
The use of internet sources herein will be extensive, especially media publications as they often 
contain direct quotes from known terrorist groups referring directly to goals, targets and tactics.  
 
Notable publications that also make direct references to the primary variables discussed herein 
are located in the work of Richardson (2006) and Philips (2009) whose accounts of terrorism 
includes many direct quotations from terrorist groups as well as extensive research on groups 
known goals, targets and tactics. Supplementary texts included herein are by Abed-Kotob (1995) 
who illustrates the divergent goals of the Muslim Brotherhood as it grew and Rapoport (2004) 
who helps establish the importance of the Iranian Revolution for the “fourth wave” of terrorism – 
forming the basis from which Hezbollah is discussed. 
 
This section will establish a firm historical basis from which the new terrorism can be compared. 
It is in the comparison of the time periods that meaningful results about the changing concept of 
terrorism can be discussed. 
1.5.4 Islamic Fundamentalism 2001-2009: 
In this section the period 2001 to 2009 will discussed within the same framework as the previous 
section by looking at an organisation within the identified category of Islamic fundamentalism. 
For this purpose al-Qaeda has been selected as a case study focusing on the text Al-Qaeda by 
Jason Burke (2007) which establishes how al-Qaeda formed, its nuanced group structure and 
overarching goals. These goals will be supplemented by Blanchard (2007) who provides an 
interesting collection of al-Qaeda statements in the period 1994-2007.  Manning (2006) will also 
be discussed in this regard as his analysis helps explain the transnational character of al-Qaeda as 
a rational reaction to counter-terrorism practices. Further supplementary texts include Kalic 
(2010), Hellmich (2005), and Castells (2004). 
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1.6 Limitations and Delimitations of the Research Study: 
Foreseeable limitations in the production of this thesis are few; however, time, as in all research, 
is a factor of limitation a great deal of work has to be covered in a short period. The research is 
thus reflective of this, attempting to make generalised assumptions without getting distracted by 
the vast amount of available data since the timeframe to be covered herein is from 1945 to 2009. 
This data is found in the numerous texts, publications and perspectives on terrorism. Andrew 
Silke (cited in Lentini, 2008:133) has indicated that since 9/11 there has been a new book on 
terrorism appearing nearly every 6 hours, and peer-reviewed papers have increased by 
approximately 300%. Also a hindrance in this regard is trying to compact all relevant 
information into 70 to 90 pages of work. Finally, only texts written in English will be used. 
 
Perhaps the most important limitation herein is the terrorist group itself. One has to try and 
objectively assess the quality of information recognising that certain information on terrorist 
groups is merely speculation or in fact untrue. There is a question mark over how much real and 
factual information exists. Also, the sensitivity of the topic (given the violence and destruction 
that terrorism and terrorists are associated with) must be kept in mind so as to avoid overly 
sensationalised claims - objectivity must be maintained. 
 
The delimitations in conducting this research are the wealth of information available and the time 
frame in which the research is being conducted. Over a period of 65 years there are numerous 
historical accounts to utilise in order to provide a rich picture of past events. However, to provide 
focus to the research herein only one of a possible three identities of terrorism – Islamic 
fundamentalism is focused on, while terrorism in the service of national liberation and ethnic 
separatism as well as left-wing terrorism are not discussed. These identities are however 
recognised as further avenues for study. 
1.7 Chapter Outline for the Research Study: 
Chapter 2 serves to conceptualise the main concepts of the study and provide a theoretical 
grounding for the research. Accordingly the chapter will begin by outlining the rational choice 
framework as it exists in PRA and as it is applied to terrorism. Secondly the chapter will define 
the parameters of PRA and then move onto a discussion of what is conceptually understood as 
terrorism versus new terrorism. Also discussed herein is that rationality of terrorism. In the final 
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instance the terrorist identity used herein will be discussed providing the core characteristics of 
Islamic fundamentalism and known terrorist groups that are considered as such. 
 
Chapter 3 will develop the first historical time period for the analysis. Two relevant Islamic 
fundamentalist groups will be analysed in terms of their goals, targets and tactics for the period 
1945 to 2000. These groups are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. In a summary table the 
structural overview, primary goals, targets and tactics of each group will be given illustrating the 
similarities and difference between each group as well as laying the ground work for comparison 
with the next time period 2001-2009. A discussion on the time period will also reveal what is 
conceptualised to be old terrorism. 
 
Chapter 3 will also develop second historical time period for analysis. Al-Qaeda as an Islamic 
fundamentalist group will be discussed in this regard. Similarly to the previous time period 
discussed in this chapter a summary table will illustrate the structural overview, primary goals, 
targets and tactics of each group to allow for easy comparison. A discussion will also 
conceptualise what is observed to be new terrorism.  
 
Chapter 4 will set about analysing and discussing the core characterises of the primary variables 
of both old and new terrorism. From this analysis the novelty and value of new terrorism will be 
clearly established. Also, chapter 4 will serve as a means to discuss any secondary variables for 
analysis – should any occur. 
 
Chapter 5 will provide a summary of the main findings and conclusions that this research paper 
achieves.   
1.8 Conclusion: 
In summary, this research study assess the value of new terrorism versus old terrorism through 
the examination of the primary variables goals, targets and tactics of Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorist groups to help provide a richer understanding of the terrorist/terrorism concept in PRA. 
The reason for such an undertaking is to avoid too narrow a focus which can hinder risk 
mitigation strategies. To locate change the analysis is done in two distinct time periods and 
qualitatively attempts to make broad generalisations as to how the terrorism variable has 
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changed. This exploratory and evaluative analysis is underpinned by a rational choice framework 
as it occurs in PRA and understands terrorists and terrorist groups as rational actors who seek to 
maximise their own utility. From this understanding an attempt will be made to show that the 
concept of new terrorism holds little weight as a concept for analysis in PRA.  
 
In the following chapter, the conceptualisation of what constitutes PRA and the rational choice 
framework will be discussed so as to lay the basis for the introduction of the concept of terrorism 
and new terrorism. All other key concepts located within this research study will also be 
conceptualised. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Key Terms 
2.1 Introduction: 
“Often it is not easy to deconstruct political risk in terms of its causes, probability, and impact. 
That does not mean that the process of analyzing difficult issues is not valuable” (Bremmer and 
Keat, 2009:5). On the contrary, it is vitally important. Political risk addresses the so-called 
“black swan logic”, a term coined by Nassim Taleb, by attempting to make what we do not know 
far more relevant than what we do know (Taleb, 2008: xix). In this process of knowing what we 
cannot know there are a number of given conditions. First and foremost it is vital to assume a 
degree of uncertainty about future events. Secondly, it is important to analyse the environment in 
which uncertainty operates. Thirdly, it is necessary to assume that by knowing of uncertainty, 
there is a certainty of risk. Finally, through the forecasting of risk the positive and negative value 
of risk may be fully utilised. 
The process of trying to know what we cannot know leads us to the conceptualisation of political 
risk and the related concepts for this research study. To this end, this chapter will construct a 
conceptualisation of political risk that recognises the uncertainty of future events, the 
construction of risk through uncertainty, and the environment in which risk is analysed as well as 
the actors involved – in this case the actors that are risk averse (actors who use the process of 
PRA to reduce uncertainty) and the terrorists (the actors that create uncertainty in the risk 
environment). 
This chapter will begin by outlining the rational choice framework that guides the theoretical 
grounding of political risk analysis. Secondly, the chapter will set the conceptual parameters of 
the key terms associated with the field of PRA. This includes risk, micro political risk vs. macro 
political risk, PRA and country risk. Also, both terrorism and new terrorism will be 
conceptualised and discussed within the rational choice framework. In the final instance the 
terrorist identity used herein will be discussed providing the overarching characteristics of 
Islamic fundamentalism which forms that basis of the remaining chapters herein. 
2.2 The Rational Choice Framework: 
Rational choice theory makes a number of assumptions about human behaviour and decision 
making. Firstly, rational choice assumes that individuals have preferences over various states of 
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the world (Bray, 2009:3). Thus rational choice depends on two key processes, 1) what 
alternatives exist in the world, and 2) two guesses about future consequences. The first guess is 
how the choice will influence future states of the world, and the second guess is how the decision 
maker will feel about that future when it is experienced (March, 1994:3). Within economics this 
means that consumers know whether they prefer chips to chocolate and can therefore rank their 
preferences based on their perceived outcomes. This rank is referred to as utility in economics. 
This also implies that rational decision makers respond to incentives, since incentives will alter 
the utility attached to a perceived outcome. 
Secondly, rational choice assumes that individuals will act in such a way that is systematic, 
consistent and predictable in order to achieve those preferences. Importantly, in rational choice 
preferences do not have to be „rational‟ however, rational actors must act on those preferences in 
a consistent way (Bray, 2009:3). This assumption is expressed by the concept of transitivity. 
Transitivity requires that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. 
This means that when individuals are offered the same choices repeatedly that they do not 
reverse their choices repeatedly. This concept represents the ranking of preferences and the 
ordering of utility (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986:253). 
To achieve the assumptions outlined above decision makers that are rational are assumed to 
possess two essential sets of knowledge: complete knowledge of one‟s own interests and, 
flawless calculation of what actions will best serve those interests (Dixit and Skeath, 2004:30). 
Furthermore it is important to realise that the above assumptions of rational choice do not mean 
that decision makers are selfish. Similarly it does not mean that decision-makers only consider 
short-run objectives and it does not mean that all decision makers share the same value system – 
it merely means decision makers follow one‟s own value system consistently (Dixit and Skeath, 
2004:30). 
Finally, within a rational choice framework preference outcomes and therefore utility is limited 
by constraints. Examples of constraints are numerous and case dependant; however when 
considering terrorist activities incomplete information, money, and logistical resources can be 
considered constraints for risk averse actors to achieving preferred outcomes. 
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As it relates to risk the rational choice framework reduces risk to human choice. That is, given a 
selected number of preferred outcomes, risk exists in attaining the preferred outcome given 
actions by other actors in the world. This means that PRA is thus a means to learn preferences 
and reduce subjective knowledge about human action so as to forecast future decision outcomes 
and reduce uncertainty. As quoted in March (1994:13) decision makers “use results of memory 
as a proxy for the projection of future probability”. This process in decision making of using 
history to forecast future outcomes is known as heuristics. As will be conceptualized, a rational 
approach to PRA has congruent outcomes to heuristics and thus rational choice. 
It is from within this theoretical approach that PRA is grounded. This is highlighted extensively 
in Brink (2004:30) who notes when there is an interest to invest (a preference), and a client is 
uncertain of the best option, various possible preference outcomes can be analysed and compared 
by means of PRA as a way of managing such uncertainty. “The application of management 
science can be viewed as a rational attempt at problem-solving” (Brink, 2004:30).  
Apart from being grounded in rational choice theory, PRA can apply a rational choice 
framework to understanding variables and concepts for analysis – in this case terrorism and/or 
new terrorism. From this point of departure Sch  n (1982 cited in Brink, 2004:32) argues that 
successful decision makers and risk analysts strive to do two things. They try to relate new 
experiences to their existing past experiences, and also often try to maintain the uniqueness of 
the current situation. A good professional does not simply apply a standard response but tries to 
keep in mind what is different and special about current circumstances. As it is argued herein the 
primacy given to new terrorism as a sort of „special current circumstance‟ is overstated which 
can potentially unbalance that analytical process that PRA strives to maintain, i.e. a holistic 
heuristic balance between past knowledge and current experience.  
2.3 Conceptualisation of Key Concepts: 
2.3.1 Risk: 
Political risk analysis became a popular field of study in the wake of the 1973-74 oil crises. This 
severe economic event illustrated the importance of political risk analysis to investors (Brink, 
2004:3). This period was however short lived and in the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, 
particularly given the Cold War, political risk analysis lost its pre-eminence. This was as a result 
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of poor analytical techniques and inaccurate forecasting. Also the conceptualisation of what 
constituted political risk was challenged with growing trends in globalisation (Hawkins, 1996:6). 
“Increased uncertainty and the salience of non-traditional business and societal risks such as 
terrorism...have not only increased the awareness of risk in a complex environment, but have 
also increased the demand for risk analysis” (Hough et al, 2008:6). It is within this new global 
context that the question can be asked – what is risk? 
Friedman and Kim (1988:64) refer to a number of definitions of risk, making special mention of 
the fact that risk is hard to clarify. Some commonalities among the authors on the matter cited in 
Friedman and Kim (1988:64) refer to such things as “probability”, “chance”, and “loss.” Simply 
put risk could refer to the probability or chance of future loss. While this is adequate it does not 
satisfy on a deeper meta-analytical level. According to Kobrin (1979:70) risk “has perfect 
knowledge of both all possible outcomes associated with an event and the probability of their 
occurrence, either through calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience.” This leaves 
one asking about the black swan. How do we know what we cannot know?  
The definition derived from Friedman and Kim (1988) when viewed after revising Kobrin (1979) 
presents a number of questions and challenges to the reader. Are risks only those entities that can 
be perfectly forecast and accounted for? What about that which we are uncertain? 
To answer these questions, one must conceive that risk is more than just “perfect knowledge of 
both probable outcomes...and the probability of their occurrence.” To concede that risk is 
founded in perfect knowledge accepts a basic premise of pure rationality – “all decision-makers 
share a common set of (basic) preferences, that alternatives and their consequences are defined 
by the environment, and that decision makers have perfect knowledge of those alternatives and 
their consequences” (March, 1994:3-4). This premise makes no account for that which we cannot 
know and the nature of imperfect information in the environment in which decision-makers‟ 
operate. One cannot possibly conceive of all possible outcomes from an act in the political 
environment. 
Rather, actors must accept that there are things that cannot be known, which acknowledges 
limited rationality in the sense that there always exists uncertainty about consequences. 
“Uncertainty may be imagined to exist either because some processes are uncertain at their most 
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fundamental levels or because decision makers‟ ignorance about the mechanisms driving various 
processes make outcomes look uncertain to them” (March, 1994:5-6). Kobrin (1979:70) makes 
note of the nature of uncertainty by classifying uncertainty in terms of “objective uncertainty” 
and “subjective uncertainty.” 
Subjective uncertainty refers to a situation where actors perceptions about the probability of an 
event occurring are based on “available information, previous experience, and individual 
cognitive processes which synthesize both into an imagined future” (Kobrin, 1979:70). This is 
congruent to heuristics within rational choice and illustrates a degree of limited rationality. 
Objective uncertainty refers to a state where actors perceptions about the probability of an event 
occurring are founded in the situation where no single outcome dominates another and “all 
feasible outcomes are known, information is readily available, and all (or almost all) observers 
agree upon the probabilities” (Kobrin, 1979:70). This state is such that pure rationality exists and 
perfect decisions can be made. 
From the above we can note that risk and risk analysis is in flux between both pure rationality 
and limited rationality. It extends beyond perfect knowledge by recognising that its knowledge is 
imperfect. The knowledge of uncertainty is the risk. This is essentially subjective uncertainty, but 
through the process of rational choice, actors will always seek to reduce the level of uncertainty 
such that it becomes objectively known. Risk analysis recognises the limited rationality of 
subjective uncertainty, and seeks the perfect rationality of objective uncertainty. Risk analysis is 
thus the dialectical process between that which we know and that which we cannot know but 
want to. 
Risk, at a meta-analytical level, can thus be defined as the situation “where the precise 
consequences are uncertain but their probabilities are known” (March, 1994: 6). 
Taking into account the positive and negative nature of risk, in the sense that it can be both 
exploited and exploitative, for the purpose of this research study a definition of risk will read: 
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Risk is forecasting unknown consequences through known probabilities so as to reduce future 
loss or make future profit.
12
 
2.3.2 Political Risk Analysis: 
From the above it is obvious that the risks defined herein occur in the context of the political 
environment. What is less obvious is the composition of this political environment in terms of 
the field of political risk analysis. Who are the actors and what sort of risks do they pose, to 
whom? 
Authors like Kobrin (1979:67) note that political risk is most “commonly conceived of in terms 
of government (usually host government) interference with business operations.” Simon 
(1984:125) argues however, that “theories that focus exclusively on the host government as the 
initiator of political risk are misperceptions of the role of the state in the political risk process.” 
Simon (1984:125) goes on to note that the government-business interaction, while relevant, is 
too narrow and other relationships at a political level need to be considered. Simon (1982:66) 
addresses this more clearly in his earlier work by referring to the risks posed by “societal and 
governmental related actions and policies, as well as internally and externally based events.” 
Internal events occur within a specific state, and external events are events that occur outside of 
the state but act in. Within this research study the key actor that produces the political risk is the 
terrorist organisation. This organisation usually originates from within the societal level, and 
seeks to influence the societal and/or governmental and/or economic environment in the pursuit 
of its own goals or agenda.  
Given the above definition of what constitutes the rational choice framework and risk, as well as 
the newly conceived political environment, the over-arching concept of political risk can now 
take its full form. Frei and Ruloff (1988:2) offered a very simple construct when they referred to 
political risk as “the entire scope of uncertainty posed by the political environment.”  This 
political environment as defined above is composed of societal and governmental variables and 
their interaction with the enterprise/business. When reading Alon and Martin (1998:13) however, 
                                                 
12
Friedman and Kim (1988:64) note that risk (in the context of PRA) can only exist in the context of an 
organisational entity or business activity. This assumption is implicit as the definition refers to “future loss” and 
“future profit” which necessarily assumes the existence of a profit driven actor as a decision-maker. 
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as opposed to referring directly to macro and micro threats in the enterprise/business they use the 
word “economy” to signify business actors or variables, and the environment it directly operates 
in, as well as the potential for economic gains and losses. This notion of economy signifies such 
things as GDP
13
 growth, income distribution and the likelihood that economic goals will be met 
(Alon and Martin, 1998:14). This also forms part of the political environment as the interactions 
between societal-governmental-economic variables and actors continually define and redefine 
each other. PRA uses a rational system as a means to reduce uncertainty in this environment and 
create probable forecasts of future events. This rational system is a “deliberative, analytical 
system that functions by way of established rules of logic and evidence” (Slovic et al, 2004:6). 
Given the nature of political risk as it is grounded in a rational choice framework this author‟s 
definition of PRA will read: 
Political Risk Analysis is the forecasting
14
 of unknown consequences (risk), which originates in 
the environment of societal-governmental-economic interactions (at their various levels), 
through known probabilities so as to reduce future loss or make future profit for business. 
2.3.3 Country Risk: 
Within the context of this thesis an important distinction exists between political risk and country 
risk. From Brink (2004:22-23) it is clear that country risk is almost exclusively tied to 
economics, and generally tends to avoid variables of a political nature. Friedman and Kim 
(1988:64-65) highlight that country risk is said to be caused by...situations in a country which are 
economical, financial, or socio-political, while political risk is seen as being brought about by 
political sources.” 
To paraphrase the example used by Brink (2004:23) country risk implies the financial/economic 
inability of a country to repay a loan, whilst political risk refers to economic, governmental, and 
societal reasons to be unwilling to do so.  
                                                 
13
 GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product and is defined as the “total value of all final goods and services produced 
within the geographic boundaries of a country in an annual period (Mohr, 2005: 19). 
14
 “Forecasting” is favoured for use over “prediction” since forecasting is a scientific and objective rational process 
of projecting the certainty of past events into the uncertainty of future outcomes. Prediction is highly dependent on 
intuition and gut-feelings and is therefore subjectively biased and not considered scientific or reproducible as a 
method of analysis (Transtutors, 2010). 
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Country risk implies that if a country owes X and has X it will pay – given past experience of 
history of payments. Political risk implies that if a country owes X and has X it may still not pay 
due to other strategic interests in the political environment. 
For example, assume Angola has a positive balance of payments in excess of $5 billion from 
resource revenues and they are seeking a loan of a further $4 billion for infrastructure 
development. In terms of country risk on a scale of 1 (guaranteed repayment) to 10 (no chance of 
repayment) the chance that Angola has the ability to repay the loan is close to 1. They would 
thus score very low on a country risk profile. This means that Angola‟s ability to repay the loan 
is very good owing to the fact that they have $5 billion in resource revenues. However, when 
taking into account the years of bloodshed, political turmoil and harsh government politics 
directed at foreign mining firms an assumption can be made that the political risk of opening a 
mine in Angola would be closer to 10 than 1 (where 1=low risk and 10=high risk). 
From this example, which is a hyperbole, one can see that political risk may take into account 
country risk but that country risk does not take into account political risk. In this sense political 
risk is perhaps less nuanced and more interpretive. 
Also, from the definition of country risk it is important to note how it does not take into account 
variables at a societal level, like terrorism. It therefore is not relevant herein. What is relevant 
herein however is the following distinction between micro and macro political risk as this can 
have a potential impact on the type of terrorism being studied, what its goals are, and whether or 
not they are selective or broad-based? 
2.3.4 Micro Political Risk vs. Macro Political Risk: 
Further terminology can be added to this complex political environment by referring to the two 
terms introduced by Robock (1971:9). These terms characterise the nature of the political risk 
environment and are referred to as the micro and macro environment. Micro threats are risks 
directed at selective businesses or enterprises, while macro threats are directed at all businesses 
or enterprises (usually foreign enterprises are targeted by local governments). When analysing 
terrorism it is important to realise that terrorism occurs at both the micro and macro level – i.e. 
terrorism can be directed at specific industry or unilaterally applied. The activities of the Belgian 
CCC (Communist Combatant Cells) represents a micro level terrorist campaign in which Banks 
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were targeted almost exclusively since, according to the group, they represented “major havens 
for the financial oligarchy in the country” (Enders and Sandler, 2006:56). An example of a 
macro terrorist threat is the transnational nature of al-Qaeda operations in particular the 9/11 
attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.  
Simon (1982:67) represents the difference between micro and macro risk graphically in Table 1: 
Table 1: Macro and Micro Threats of Political Risk 
 Macro Micro 
 Societal Governmental Societal Governmental 
In
te
rn
a
l 
 Revolution 
 Coup d‟état 
 Expropriation 
 High inflation 
 Selective terrorism 
 Selective strikes 
 Discriminatory taxes 
 Subsidization 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
 International 
terrorism 
 Disinvestment 
pressure 
 Nuclear war 
 Border conflicts 
 International 
activists 
 International firm 
boycott 
 Bilateral Trade 
 Multilateral Trade 
 
From Table 1 it can be deduced that the political environment refers to societal-government-
business interactions. These interactions occur at a macro or micro level and may come from 
both internal and external sources. The relevance of this conceptual clarification is the primacy 
that new terrorism places on macro terrorism versus micro terrorism as well as the transnational 
versus the domestic as highlighted further on herein. 
2.3.5 Political Risk vs. Political Instability: 
Political instability, according to Robock (1971:8), as represented, for example, by an 
unexpected change in government leadership, “may or may not involve political risk for 
international business. Political instability... is a separate although related phenomenon from that 
of political risk.” 
What Robock (1971) is trying to highlight is that the processes of government change need not 
necessarily create risk. Leadership may change constantly but decisions towards business may 
not. In this sense, political instability is a property of the political environment. It can occur in 
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spite of the presence of business, whilst political risk by its very definition assumes an effect on 
business in either the form of profit loss or profit gain. As noted in Friedman and Kim (1988:64) 
“without the existence of an organisational entity, or a business project, risk may not exist, but 
stability/instability can.” Political risk assumes interactions through the environment between 
actors; however instability assumes changes in the environment regardless of business actors. 
An example of this is the stability of the USA‟s electoral system. While the presidents are voted 
in and out of office democratically and predictably the stability of the environment hides the 
risks of policy change. The first term of George Bush‟s presidency, regardless of the political 
stability, created an internal macro risk for private businesses in 2003 when he directed the 
Department of Homeland Security to compile a list of structural vulnerabilities to the nation‟s 
critical infrastructure. Private companies accounted for 85% of the designated infrastructure and 
were warned to comply or to be strong armed by the government – facing financial penalties and 
loss of investment (Laudicina, 2005:143-144). In this example the political stability of the 
environment belies the political risk inside it. 
Similarly the instability of an environment may belie the lack of political risk inside it. An 
example is that of large oil companies operating in notoriously unstable countries around Africa. 
“Companies [like] Gulf in Angola have “sat out” extended civil wars and operated profitably in 
unstable environments” (Robock, 1971:115) often being largely unaffected by major regime 
change. 
The two examples above show that while there may be political stability/instability there may or 
may not be political risk. For this reason political risk and political stability are not synonymous.  
As this relates to the threat of terrorism it has been illustrated by Enders and Sandler (2006) in 
their book entitled The Political Economy of Terrorism that politically stable liberal democratic 
regimes are the most susceptible to the threat of terrorism. This is because rationally liberal 
democratic regimes have to make a trade-off between civil liberties and the threat of terrorism - 
many civil freedoms granted to society (freedom of association, freedom of speech etc.) also 
allow terrorists the same freedom within which to make plans and attack. Conversely, regimes 
that are generally unstable and authoritarian do not have to guarantee civil freedoms therefore 
these states have more power to suppress not only their own citizens but terrorists operating 
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within their borders too. It seems that in the case of terrorism, one can tentatively extrapolate that 
political instability has a greater ability to reduce terrorism as a political risk due to the fact that 
civil liberties can be excluded more easily and with greater force. Whether this extrapolation can 
be factually established or not is out of the scope of this research study. 
2.3.6 Terrorism and New Terrorism: 
Richardson (2006: 20-22) highlights seven key characteristics of terrorism. Firstly, a terrorist act 
is political. This factor separates terrorism from crime. Secondly, the act of terrorism must 
involve the threat of violence or the use of violence. To this end such labels as “info terror” and 
“cyber terror” are not considered as terrorism herein. Thirdly, a primary goal of terrorism is to 
communicate a message; terrorism is not violence (or the threat thereof) for the sake of it. 
Fourth, the act, as well as the victim (target), represents some significance in the representation 
of the political message. Fifth, terrorism is the act of sub-state actors, not states. This highlights 
the asymmetry of power between terrorists and the societies or states that they seek to influence. 
Sixth, the victim of terrorism is very often removed from the primary audience that terrorists 
seek to change or express a message to. The point of terror is to use the victim as a means to 
convey the larger political message to a more powerful audience. Finally, because of the 
asymmetry of power that exists between terrorist organisations and states, terrorists target non-
combatants or civilians. Violence directed towards non-combatants is not accidental, unlike state 
military confrontations, it is deliberate. This is how the locus of terror is created through the 
targeting of ordinary people or civilians. 
A useful definition that encapsulates the above characteristics of terrorism is the definition used 
by the US Department of State (2003, xiii cited in Enders and Sandler 2006:3): “Terrorism 
means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” 
To add further conceptual weight to the understanding of terrorism it is important to further 
distinguish between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism 
according to Enders and Sandler (2006:6) “is home-grown and has consequences just for the host 
country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. In a domestic incident, the perpetrators, 
victims, and audience are all from the host country.” An example, in this regard is the terrorist 
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campaign conducted by the Red Brigades in Italy which sought to significantly undermine the 
Italian state during the 1970‟s (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 108). 
Conversely, transnational terrorism is when a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, 
perpetrators, or audiences in two or more countries. A terrorist act may be transnational owing to 
its impact, planning and execution, its perpetrators, or its targets and resulting damage (Enders 
and Sandler, 2005: 468). An example is the simultaneous bombing of American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by al-Qaeda. 
Finally, a thorough discussion on new terrorism
15
 is constructed in Laquer (1996) and Spencer 
(2006). Spencer (2006: 9) notes that the concept emerged in the mid-1990‟s particularly after the 
1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre, and the 1995 sarin gas attacks in Tokyo Japan by the 
cult Aum Shinrikyo. It is within this climate that Laquer (1996) begins to talk of „postmodern‟ 
terrorism due to the failure of conventional definitions of terrorism to capture the global 
phenomenon. This „postmodern‟ terrorism is characterised by transnational terror networks that 
use indiscriminate killing rather than attacking specific targets (Laquer, 1996:25). Hoffman 
(cited in Spencer, 2006:9) makes special mention of the trend that new terrorism is driven by 
religious extremism that has an uncompromising world view and largely seeks the destruction of 
established society which contributes to the use of indiscriminate killing as a tactic. Also, new 
terrorism is characterised by increasingly riskier and complex terrorist operations of which 
suicide terrorism is an example. This increased riskiness coupled with growing technological 
awareness means the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups is 
increasingly more likely (Spencer, 2006:10).  Finally, new terrorism is also characterised by 
amateur terrorists with little experience or concrete group ties. Groups are no longer hierarchical 
rather they are loose networks (Spencer, 2006: 11). The afore mentioned characteristics are 
summed up in Hough (2005: 2) who notes that new terrorism places primacy on the transnational 
and argues that terrorists operate transnationally, in loosely organised networks; that they are 
largely motivated by religious extremism, and that they aim at mass casualties and attempt to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction for the targeting of indiscriminate victims.  
                                                 
15
 The concept of new terrorism arguably first appears in Laquer‟s (1996) Postmodern Terrorism.   
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These two distinct concepts frame the concept of terrorism in two different lights. It is argued 
herein that this new understanding of terrorism is counterproductive and that the concept of new 
terrorism is in fact not new and is not a valid replacement to terrorism as a concept for analysis 
in PRA. 
2.3.7 Islamic Fundamentalism: 
The Islamic religion was founded by the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century CE, and like 
Christianity and Judaism it is monotheistic
16
. The early origin of Islamic fundamentalism dates 
back to the formation of the Shi‟a and Sunni Muslim sects and their disagreement on how the 
leader of the Umma (the community of Muslim faithful) should be selected after the death of the 
Prophet. The Shi‟a argued that the Caliphate (successor to the Prophet Mohammed and leader of 
the Umma) should remain in the hands of Mohammad‟s lineal descendants. The Sunni on the 
other hand contended that the Caliph could be any man meeting certain criteria of faith and 
learning. A bitter struggled ensued between the Shi‟a and the more moderate Sunni - in which 
the Sunni eventually gained ascendency as well as the majority of Muslim followers (Shughart, 
2006: 17-28).  
Coupled with this inherent disagreement about the Islamic faith is the strand of fundamentalism 
woven into Islamic theology during the 18
th
 century. This followed the doctrine of Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his support for the Shi‟a. His purpose was expressed as a campaign of 
purification and renewal where he sought to return the Muslim world to the pure and authentic 
Islam of the Prophet, removing and if necessary destroying all those opposed. This 
fundamentalist idea is carried on in the notion of Wahhabism and leads its followers to disdain, 
above all, “false Muslims” who do not follow Shari‟a (Islamic Law) or correctly practice the 
ways of Islam – making them infidels. If a Muslim group could show proof that the laws of 
Islam had been incorrectly practiced, the strictures against Muslims using violence on Muslims 
no longer applied (Botha, 2008:17). This heralded in a movement of Islamist terrorist groups that 
fought against the “more liberal, tolerant, and pluralist” Muslim rulers in the Middle East 
(Shughart, 2006: 28). This also helped radicalise opposition to colonialism in the national 
uprisings which characterised decolonisation in the post-war period. 
                                                 
16
 Monotheism is the belief in one god. In Islam this is Allah (Rowe, 2001:5) 
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Contributing to the fundamentalism inherent in Wahhabism, the colonial experience of 
predominately Muslim nations gave rise to a number of nationalist movements. These 
movements, however, were largely secular aligning themselves purely to political ideals. 
Fundamentalism thus became a representation of the need to have a nationalist project that had 
Islamic principles in mind. Islam has always been considered a universal religion in the sense 
that Islam dominates all dimensions of human existence. The key factor in this regard is the 
primacy followers of Islam (in particular Shi‟a Muslims) place on Islamic Law to achieve this 
universality. It is this factor that links the Islamic religion to politics (Milton-Edwards, 2005:11). 
Fundamentalism in the post-war period thus became a representation of political and religious 
Islamic beliefs in opposition to the colonial experience. 
Other characteristics of fundamentalism (be it Islamic or other monotheistic religions) are 
religious idealism, cosmic struggle, demonising the opponent, reactionary thinking, and envy of 
the modernist hegemony and the revolutionary overthrow of power (Milton-Edwards, 2005: 2). 
The Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups that are to be discussed within this context are: the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.  
Within the overarching context of this research study this understanding of Islamic 
fundamentalism is important as it illustrates that fundamentalism is not a 21
st
 century novelty. 
Islam has long been in competition with established secular societies and institutions. Islam has 
also long been a part of politics and with the more recent growth rate of Islamic followers at 
roughly 2.9 percent the global population of Muslim followers can be approximated to be in the 
region of 1 billion (Dixon, 2004:237). This implies that there will likely be a growing tendency 
to challenge institutions, governments and societies that do not adhere to Islamic laws, 
particularly in states that are predominately Muslim. This is already being expressed in certain 
countries in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia where Muslims are in conflict with non-
Muslims for control of the government, as well as, Sunni Muslims are in conflict with Shi‟a 
Muslims with regard to the stringency with which Islamic law is interpreted.  
2.4 Contextualisation: Terrorism within a Rational Choice Framework 
As mentioned in the previous chapter this research study will use a rational choice framework as 
it guides the political risk assessment process and also the terrorist organisation. However, there 
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are a number of objections to applying rational choice to terrorism. The first objection comes 
from Bandura (1990:79) who notes that rational choice is a theory for individual behaviour and 
terrorist behaviour “can best be explained by the psychology of the group.” A second objection is 
the assumption in rational choice that individuals rationally seek to maximise their well-being. In 
this instance Caplan (2006) points to suicide terrorism, where the personal cost far exceeds 
personal benefit. 
The first criticism goes to the debate on structure and agency where there is dialectic between the 
group and the individual in which they consistently shape one another‟s values and roles. When 
applying rational choice it is logical to assume that as rational choice shapes the individual it in 
turn shapes the values of the group and vice-versa. This criticism can also be discarded by 
relaxing the assumption of rational choice that it purely applies to individuals – this is covered 
extensively in March (1994). 
Pape (2003) provides a promising rebuttal to the second criticism in his text The Strategic Logic 
of Terrorism in which he highlights the rationality of suicide terrorism as a tactic given 
constraints on the terrorist group and given relevant motives and outcomes. Caplan (2006) also 
concedes that, apart from suicide terrorism, terrorism at the very least is “probably close” to 
rational. Caplan (2006) also concedes that the principle of self-interest in rational choice need 
not be strictly applied to rational choice. These rebuttals go a long way in supporting the 
following argument.  
Despite these criticisms Bray (2009:2) notes a number of benefits of considering violent political 
behaviour and terrorism in terms of rational choice. First, rational choice can explore the motives 
of terrorists within a single conceptual framework from tacit approval to explicit monetary 
support. Second, rational choice theory does not pass value judgements on the reasonableness of 
individual‟s preferences. Therefore, it is applicable no matter what the individual‟s religious, 
moral or political beliefs.  Third, rational choice explicitly considers constraints on individual 
behaviour. Finally, the forecasts made by rational choice can be tested empirically using 
observational data. This final point however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The question then has to be asked and answered – What makes terrorism/terrorist rational? 
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Caplan (2006:93) notes that there are three classes of terrorist: sympathisers, who favour 
terrorism without doing much about it; active terrorists, who belong to a terrorist organisation, 
and suicidal terrorists, who kill themselves for the political agenda (or cause). These classes will 
now be systematically discussed given the three most important assumptions of rational choice: 
rational actors respond to constraints/incentives, rational actors are self interested, and, rational 
actors have rational expectations about preferences. 
2.4.1 Responsiveness to Incentives: 
Responsiveness to incentives implies that rational actors weight the utility of incentives versus 
the utility of constraints when identifying preferences. As far as terrorist sympathisers go, if the 
constraints to being a terrorist (persecution, imprisonment, death) drastically decreased, and there 
was no risk to being a terrorist, it seems likely that terrorist sympathisers would in fact become 
terrorists (Caplan, 2006: 94). 
Terrorists measure their involvement in a different fashion to terrorist sympathisers based on the 
fact that their preferences are different and the weights that they assign to incentives and 
constraints differ. To this end the incentive (monetary support, personal happiness, religious 
acceptance) outweigh the constraints.  
Response to incentives is similarly applied by the individual or group when selecting tactics. 
Richardson (2006:33) notes that historically the most common terrorist tactic is bombing because 
it is cheap, dramatic, indiscriminate and relatively easy to leave the scene of the crime. Therefore 
while terrorists might have preferences that seem irrational to those that do not share similar 
preferences, they still respond to incentives and constraints when acting.  
Suicide terrorism follows a similar logic. As applied to the group, suicide terrorism is a tactic 
that considers constraints and incentives – the death of a low number of group member versus a 
high impact, high death ratio against the target. Pape (2003) notes that suicide attacks are more 
likely to extract large concessions from targets making the reward greater than the loss. In this 
sense the rational individual would make his preferences based on the cost to the group versus 
the cost to the so-called enemy. 
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From the above terrorist sympathisers, terrorists and suicide terrorists can all be considered 
rational as they all respond to incentives and constraints. 
2.4.2 Narrow Self-Interest: 
Sympathisers are most obviously selfish. They agree with terrorist goals, motives and tactics and 
yet do not take part in any of the activity. This is paramount to free-riding in economic terms, 
where a certain benefit or preference can be enjoyed without having to consider the constraints 
and incentives to achieve it (Black et al, 2006: 34). Free-riding is not to say however, that they 
do not consider constraints and incentives to join a terrorist group directly it is merely stressing 
that they can selfishly enjoy the achievements of a terrorist group, without having to suffer any 
of the constraints associated with terrorist activity. 
However, what about active terrorists and suicide terrorists? A response taken by a number of 
authors who value the rational choice approach make mention of the idea that terrorists value the 
group, the political agenda and the hatred of the enemy above the value that they place on 
themselves (Gambetta, 2005; Hoffman and McCormick, 2004 cited in Caplan, 2006: 95). 
Richardson (2006:34) makes a similar claim that those who become suicide terrorists do so out 
of the value that they place on anger, humiliation, a desire for revenge, commitment to the cause 
and a desire for glory. In other words suicide terrorists give their lives “for reasons no more 
irrational than those of anyone prepared to give their lives for a cause.” Similarly Pape (2003:2) 
says “even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit 
and direct them are not.” From this perspective suicide terrorists are designed to achieve specific 
political goals, to mobilise financial support and coerce a target government which are in the 
group‟s self-interest. Finally, as noted by Caplan (2006: 94) and Dixit and Skeath (2004:30) 
narrow selfishness is very rarely an explicit condition in rational choice and can be relaxed.  
Terrorist sympathisers, terrorists and suicide terrorists can all be considered rational as they 
either are narrowly self-interested or probably close depending on how stringent the application 
of narrow self-interest is. They are, however, interested in the success of the group as a whole 
since the group ideals sustain most of their preferences. 
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2.4.3 Rational Expectations: 
One of the main reasons many see terrorists as irrational is probably that their beliefs are so 
improbable and dogmatic (Wiktorowicz, 2004 cited in Caplan, 2006; 97). The promise of 
rational choice presents a notable insight in this regard. Dixit and Skeath (2004:30) note that 
rational expectations need not mean that rational actors share the same value or belief system it 
simply means that rational actors consistently follow the value or belief system that they 
subscribe to. 
Caplan (2006:97) argues to the contrary stating that rational actors have unbiased beliefs and that 
making a mistake (with regard to expectations is one thing) but making the same mistake over 
and over is another. Random mistakes can be explained by constraints to the rational process, but 
recurring mistakes suggest a disregard for the rational process.  
Terrorist sympathisers by not engaging in terrorist activity have rational expectations that are 
very close to the rational model, but terrorists and in particular suicide terrorists require some 
investigation. 
Logically, biblical literalism as in Islamic fundamentalism seems an irrational expectation. 
Osama Bin Laden is quoted as saying that “we are certain the we shall – with the grace of Allah 
– prevail over the Americans and over the Jews, as the Messenger of Allah promised us...Instead 
of remaining United States, it shall end up separated states” (Caplan, 2006: 97). 
This expectation that the USA will fall at the hands of Allah cannot be claimed with absolute 
certainty and is extremely radical, it therefore violates rational expectation – or does it? Within a 
rational framework people can subscribe to radical doctrines and biblical literalism even though 
they get little material satisfaction from doing so; however, it must be noted that there is no 
material cost to being wrong. Transitively, however, if a radical doctrine is not believed and it 
comes true then the material cost of being wrong is very high. Pascal‟s wager illustrates this 
logical dilemma perfectly. Pascal‟s wager is based on the logic of utility and states that: the cost 
of believing in God and being wrong is less than not believing in God and finding out that He 
does exists. Therefore the rational choice would be to believe (Bernstein, 2006). 
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Within the staunch ideological, radical and religious doctrines that terrorist groups follow 
members are surrounded by other so-called true believers. It is such that the cost of not following 
the prevailing doctrine is higher than simply adhering to the doctrine. The expectations of 
terrorists are mutually reinforced by the organisation and the members within it who all place a 
higher cost on not following organisational values than following them. In this way they 
consistently follow the value or belief system that they subscribe to.  
Intriligator (2010:3) notes that the idea of substitution in economic theory applies to terrorist 
groups who, given the cost of terrorist tactics, substitute one tactic for another. In cases where 
the chances of success of a simple bombing are low and the success of a suicide bombing is high, 
the suicide tactic will substitute the more traditional bombing method. Suicide terrorists when 
considered as a tactic and not as a human choice are therefore close to perfectly rational. 
Furthermore Richardson (2006:136) notes that suicide terrorism is a group choice since the 
group plays a significant role in planning the attack, as well as training, sustaining and 
supervising the volunteer. It is likely that the individuals selected are particularly radical in their 
religious, ideological and moral expectations. Also given the likely number of terrorists being 
relatively high and the number of suicide bombers comparatively low suicide bombers can be 
seen as the exception and not necessarily the rule. 
Suicide terrorists, whilst not wholly satisfying the rational expectations assumption, are closely 
aligned to the group. It is the dynamics and the values of the group, which guide suicide 
terrorists, which are rational. This in turn makes suicide terrorists at the very least close to 
rational. 
From the above arguments terrorists, suicide terrorists and the terrorist organisation can be 
considered rational as they respond to incentives, are largely self-interested, and have rational 
expectations about future events. 
2.5 Conclusion: 
The primary aims of this chapter was to provide a conceptual understanding of the key terms 
within this study as well as introduce the theory on which this study is based. Accordingly, 
rational choice, PRA and terrorism were discussed. 
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The core of the rational choice framework stresses 3 key points: 1) rational actors have 
preferences about varying states of the world, 2) even when relaxing the narrow self-interest 
principle, rational actors still seek the preference with the highest utility given incentives and 
constraints, 3) rational actors can have varying expectations about future events, however, so 
long as they consistently act to achieve their highest expected outcome they are considered 
rational. 
When rational choice is applied to PRA it is visible that the process that PRA follows is 
congruent to the heuristic process within the rational framework. PRA also serves as a means to 
illuminate the rational processes of the actors that it seeks to analyse by reducing uncertainty and 
providing the link between subjective and objective uncertainty within a risk environment. 
The conceptualisation of political risk herein is based on principles of risk and uncertainty and 
shaped around a conceptual understanding of the political environment as being societal-
governmental-economic in its dynamic interaction. To further add range to the conceptualisation 
of political risk the micro, macro, internal and external nature of the political environment is also 
considered. What is important to recognise however is that risk can only occur in the context of 
the interaction between business/enterprises/organisations and the political environment such 
that there is the probability of future profit loss or profit gain. To this end PRA is grounded in 
rational choice theory as business/organisational actors, who are risk averse, actively seek to use 
the processes of PRA to maximise expected utility by reducing loss. 
The strength of this definition lies in its meta-analytical depth by addressing the decision-making 
structures of uncertainty and risk and the actors that operate within this environment. This gives 
PRA scope to address varying forms of risk, as well as various forms of political environmental 
actors.  
Ultimately, political risk analysis is a useful forecasting tool and according to Howell and 
Chaddick (1994:71) provides the “critical interface between the world of politics and that of 
economics.” 
The conceptualisation of terrorism illustrates that terrorist groups and terrorists are politically 
motivated, thus locating them within the political environment that PRA similarly operate in. 
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Also, due to the targeting of non-combatants terrorism can also be simultaneously located in the 
social and business environment since actors in these spheres often form part of the target agenda 
of terrorist groups.  
Terrorists and suicide terrorists were also shown to adhere to a rational framework because they 
respond to incentives, act on their own behalf or that of the group in which they have a stake and 
have rational expectations even if those expectations are not congruent to the rest of society. This 
rational framework is chiefly applied to the study of the terrorist group henceforth; it also 
recognises the rationality of individual actors. 
A discussion on what is considered new terrorism also presented the key characteristics of 
terrorism since the mid-1990‟s and in particular since 2001. Notable characteristics in this regard 
are the transnational and macro nature of new terrorism. Also important is the primacy given to 
Islamic fundamentalism.  
This chapter also indicated what is understood by Islamic fundamentalism. Defining 
characteristics of fundamentalism include: religious idealism, cosmic struggle, demonising the 
opponent, reactionary thinking, and envy of the modernist hegemony and the revolutionary 
overthrow of power (Milton-Edwards, 2005: 2). Following from this discussion the concept of 
new terrorism argues for the novelty of religious fundamentalism. This, however, is not 
considered a variable due to the blurring of the lines between political and religious goals of so-
called religious fundamentalist terrorist groups. Also from the outset of the study it is apparent 
that Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups have existed in both time periods and therefore 
religious extremism cannot be a novelty. 
A prominent feature of the terrorist landscape in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century is Islamic 
fundamentalism which adds to the level of risk associated with terrorism. It is often characterised 
as militant and radical, with such accounts focusing on the „here and now‟ threat that Islamic 
fundamentalism poses to established political and economic institutions. 
Chapter 3 will discuss Islamic fundamentalist terrorism as it existed from 1945-2009. This 
historical comparative analysis forms the basis of what is considered old terrorism versus new 
terrorism, accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda will be discussed. 
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Chapter 3: Islamic fundamentalism (1945-2009) 
3.1 Introduction: 
This chapter will begin by discussing two important Islamic fundamentalist organisations 
within the time period 1945-2000. For this purpose the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah 
have been selected. To add further depth to the historical analysis an account of the Iranian 
Revolution will also be given since Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in Iran, as a result of the 
revolution, “inspired and assisted” Shi'a terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Lebanon (Rapoport, 2004:62). Accordingly, terrorism had an "able and active state sponsor", 
a role Iran played throughout the 1990‟s (Pillar, 2001:46). Also for discussion is the influence 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the role of international actors, and the subsequent 
responses from Islamic fundamentalist groups.  
In the second instance this chapter will provide clear descriptions of the goals, targets and 
tactics of each group within the period 1945 to 2000 and illustrate notable trends within this 
time frame. This analysis will help determine the fundamental characteristics of so-called old 
terrorism. 
Moving on from the period 1945-2000, al-Qaeda will be discussed within the context of the 
second historical time period 2001-2009. The development of “al-Qaeda” from an ideal to 
what can be called a network of groups will be discussed in the section entitled al-Qaeda.  
This section will establish the group al-Qaeda as a meaningful construct in the dialogue of 
new terrorism. Once the group that is considered al-Qaeda is more firmly established, the 
goals, targets and tactics of al-Qaeda will be discussed to assess whether there are any 
significantly new observations to be made about al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism in the 
period 2001-2009 that justify the concept new terrorism.  
In concluding the most significant differences between old terrorism and new terrorism will 
be highlighted so that a discussion can take place on the value of new terrorism as a concept 
for analysis in PRA.  
3.2 The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism in the Period 1945-2000: 
As discussed in the previous chapter
33
, Islam is predominately divided between the Sunni and 
the Shi‟a34 both of which are denominations of the Muslim faith. What is important herein is 
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 Chapter 2 sub heading 2.3.7 – Islamic fundamentalism 
34
 Shiite is also an accepted term; however, Shi‟a will be used henceforth. 
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the growth of Islamic fundamentalism between both Sunni and Shi‟a sects and the increasing 
links between Islam, politics and terrorism.  
The most expressive link that Islam has to politics is through Shari‟a (Islamic Law) which 
Muslim rulers are obliged to implement over the territories of their authority. This in turn 
guarantees the universality of the Islamic faith as Islamic Law coupled with Islam as a 
religion accounts for all aspects of life, birth and death within a Muslims world view (Milton-
Edwards, 2005:14). Anneli Botha in Terrorism in the Maghreb (2005:17) notes that  “in 
practical terms Muslims are under an obligation to implement and follow God‟s Law 
[(Islamic Law)]...Those who do not implement it and follow it to the letter are regarded as 
illegitimate...[failure] to follow Islamic Law...provides sufficient grounds for a legitimate 
jihad.” Jihad is literally translated to mean „struggle‟ (Burke, 2007:30). 
The term jihad was a key concept in the first terrorist group for discussions vocabulary. 
Within the Muslim Brotherhood‟s vocabulary jihad refers not only to armed struggle to 
liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation, but also to the inner effort that Muslims 
needed to make in order to free themselves from an ingrained inferiority complex and from 
fatalism
35
 as well as passivity towards their condition (Ikwanweb, 2010).
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At a broader level this so-called struggle is undertaken by all Muslims to reunite (or destroy) 
infidels and non-believers within the universal religious principles of Islam. However, the 
jihad declared by Islamist leaders of fundamentalist organisations has been interpreted as a 
declaration of [holy] war against the West (Milton-Edwards, 2005:108). Jihad is seen as the 
final link in the chain between religion, politics and terrorism - Islam is linked to politics via 
Islamic Law, and this in turn is linked to terrorism by the principle of jihad which links back 
to Islam as a religious practice. 
 The colonial legacy challenged the ability of Muslim communities, especially in North 
Africa and the Middle East, not only to rule themselves (self-determination) but also 
challenged a key aspect of the Muslim faith – Islamic Law. This represents a break in the 
chain. Accordingly, the first fundamentalist groups adopted elements of jihad as a means to 
right the wrongs levelled against them and their religion. 
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 “Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do” (Stanford, 2010). 
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 Ikwanweb (or http://www.ikwanweb.com) is the official English language Muslim Brotherhood website. 
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As discussed in Milton-Edwards (2005:25) fundamentalism in the inter-war period of the 
early twentieth century was evident in the rise of new Muslim figures such as Hassan al-
Banna in Egypt. Hassan established the first major Islamic movement known as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This group remains active to the present day and accounts for a variety of 
activities associated with Islamic fundamentalism as a political force. Hassan was also pivotal 
in articulating fundamentalist political agendas that motivated millions to participate in 
processes that became the struggle in colonial Muslim domains for self-determination and 
independence.  
The risk of fundamentalism, and terrorism, in the period immediately after the World War II 
(1945) was located in areas where the colonial legacy was still entrenched – in particular in 
countries that had a majority Muslim population and that had growing nationalisation 
movements. Due to the nature of colonial domination terrorism in this period manifested 
itself domestically. One such group, already alluded to, is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 
3.3 The Muslim Brotherhood – A Structural Overview: 
Hassan al-Banna is arguably the founding father of modern Islamic fundamentalism. Born in 
1906 his emergence as the founder of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood – 
henceforth referred to as Brotherhood) in 1928 in the Suez Canal city of Ismailia, Egypt, 
represents, according to Milton-Edwards (2005:27), “the transition from pre-fundamentalist 
to full-fundamentalist articulation of ideas within many Muslim realms.”  
The Brotherhood is a hierarchal organisation lead by the Supreme Guide. This individual is 
aided by a thirteen member Guidance Bureau that formulates policies, manages activities and 
selects leadership. Also attached to the leadership is a consultative group of clerics – leaders 
sharing the goal of promoting Islamic Law in Egypt. In spite of its hierarchical nature the 
Brotherhood also had some 1,700-2000 decentralised branches working at a municipal level 
to aid local Egyptians neglected by the government‟s incompetence. In 1948 the Brotherhood 
had about 1 million followers and sympathisers in Egypt (Zollner, 2009:10). 
3.3.1 Goals: 
The most explicit statement of the Brotherhood‟s goals, appeared, as they still do, in their 
publication entitled The Initiative:  
 “[The Brotherhood is] working to establish God‟s law as we believe it to be the real 
effective way out of all suffering and problems. The mission could be achieved through 
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building the Muslim individual, Muslim family, Muslim government, and the Muslim state 
that leads Islamic countries, gathers all Muslims, regains Islamic glory, gives lost Muslim 
land back to its owners and carries the flag of the call of God, thus making the world happy 
via the teachings and rights of Islam” (cited in Phillips, 2009:8). 
This statement is borne out of the period between 1920 and 1945. During this time al-Banna 
formed the Brotherhood due to grievances that stemmed from the exploitation of Egyptian 
workers at the hands of foreigners at the Suez Canal Company as well as the incompetence of 
the Egyptian government to protect its citizens from such exploitation. Also heavily criticised 
was the corruption and division that the Egyptian political elite caused in the country. Al-
Banna declared that Egyptian poverty, powerlessness, and lack of dignity resulted from 
failing to adhere to Islam and adopting Western values and culture. “Islam hooah al-hal” 
(Islam is the solution to all Egyptian and mankind‟s ills), a catch-phrase still used today 
within the group, represents the frustration that the Brotherhood had with socialism, 
capitalism, and a democracy manipulated to favour the ruling party and the global elite 
(Aboul-Enien, 2003:27).  
To add insult to injury the persistent interference of the British government in Egyptian 
politics to secure allies against Nazi Germany prior to World War II resulted in the Anglo-
Egyptian treaty. This treaty added to anti-British sentiments which were already on the rise 
due to the confrontation between Jewish settlers and Muslim natives in Palestine, a land 
under British mandate. The Palestinian uprising of 1936 gained wide spread support amongst 
Egyptian nationals and members of the Brotherhood – in which the Brotherhood contributed 
a number of fighters from its armed wing. Also, the beginning of the World War II further 
galvanised support for the Brotherhood as anti-British sentiments grew even more, not only 
because Egypt did not want to become a theatre of war but also because Britain now 
demanded power over Egyptian national politics. These events exposed the powerlessness of 
the Egyptian government under King Farouk, which led to wide spread disillusionment with 
the democratic movement and the value of a parliament (Zollner, 2009:11). 
Al-Banna also heavily criticised the secular path of Egypt‟s elite, and lamented the extent to 
which Egyptians were subservient to foreign ideas. Al-Banna went as far as to criticise the 
community of clerics (Ulama) for being influenced by the British. Accordingly al-Banna 
declared that the Brotherhood would use all necessary means, including violence, to establish 
Islamic rule in Egypt in the post-war period (Phillips, 2009:7). 
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From 1926 to 1945 no significant changes occurred within the Egyptian ruling elite, despite 
political pressure from the Brotherhood. From 1945 onwards a breakdown in the relationship 
between King Farouk and then Prime Minister Nahas Pasha and the Brotherhood began to 
surface. A once tolerant relationship quickly eroded with the formation of militant guerrilla 
training camps outside of Cairo and in southern Egypt. At its outset the Brotherhood had 
developed a political, educational and social wing and by the end of World War II (1945) it 
also had a fully functional military wing known as the “Special Apparatus” (Phillips, 2009:7). 
In conjunction with the militant wing the Brotherhood established a quasi-judiciary that 
issued fatwa‟s37 against those who were judged to have betrayed faith and country. Once the 
judiciary arm condemned a person, the Brotherhood‟s militant arm carried out the sentence. 
A critical point in the Brotherhoods early history was the assassination of Al-Banna in 1949 
by the Egyptian government as retaliation for a brief programme of violence attributed to the 
Brotherhood. This is in spite of al-Banna‟s efforts to steer the group towards mainstream 
political Islam and the political centre within Egypt (Ikhwanweb, 2010).  
The assassination of al-Banna left the ideology of the Brotherhood open to a number of 
Islamic thinkers and ideologues whose philosophical justification for fundamentalist Islam 
would spread beyond a small group of extremists. For the Brotherhood such an ideologue 
was the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (Richardson, 2006: 87). 
Under the influence of Qutb, and in reaction to the harsh treatment by the political elite the 
Brotherhood aligned themselves to the Free Officers
38
 in a 1952 coup to overthrow King 
Farouk in which Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power. Nasser consolidated his power by 
abolishing the monarchy, constitution and all political parties. Nasser also set about rejecting 
foreign control and promoting a sense of Arab nationalism, however his secularism did not 
reflect the identity of many Egyptians. Qutb‟s philosophy of fundamentalism coupled with 
the failure of Nasser and the Egyptian government to promote Islamic Law eventually trigged 
the emergence of even more hostile, violent and radical groups committed to imposing 
Islamic Law within Egypt, for example Al-Jihad
39
 (Phillips, 2009:8).  
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 A fatwa is a legal statement or ruling issued by an Islamic scholar. 
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 The Free Officers refers to a clandestine group of young officers from within the Egyptian military formed 
under Gamal Abdul Nasser (Onwar, 2010). 
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 Al-Jihad or Egyptian Islamic Jihad has been active in Egypt since the 1970‟s and currently has strong links to 
al-Qaeda (Castells, 2004). 
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By 1954 the Brotherhood had rejected Nasser and rallied a number of protests. A member of 
the Brotherhood also attempted to assassinate Nasser. When Nasser uncovered the plot a 
nationwide sweep arrested some 20,000 Brotherhood members (placing them in internment 
camps) and banned the Brotherhood
40
. Among the arrested was Qutb.  
While in prison Qutb wrote Signposts on the Road (Ma‟alim fi al-tariq). This work is the 
seminal literary work articulating Islamic fundamentalist and is considered the founding 
manifesto of jihadism (Phillips, 2009:11). Qutb was as radical as to deny all forms of human 
rule on earth, including democracy.  
Qutb is cited in Phillips (2009:12) as follows:  
“To declare divinity for God alone...means a full revolt against human rulership in all 
its shapes and forms, systems, and arrangements. It means destroying the kingdom of man to 
establish the Kingdom of God on earth...the wresting of power from the hands of its human 
usurpers to return it to God alone; the supremacy of divine law alone and the cancellation of 
human laws.” 
The execution of Qutb in 1966 at the hands of Nasser as well as the humiliating defeat of 
Egypt and its allies to Israel in the Six Day War on June 1967 further accelerated Islamic 
fundamentalism in Egypt. The government was again blamed, and the loss was seen as 
punishment by God for its secularism (Phillips, 2009:9). At this time, an already growing 
split in the ideological path of the Brotherhood became even more apparent. The more radical 
members favoured an immediate revolution, while the moderates favoured a more long term 
political solution. 
Nasser‟s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, introduced a policy of economic liberalisation and, to a 
much lesser extent, political liberalisation. In 1971 the internment camps were closed, and the 
regime began to gradually release the imprisoned Brothers, though the organisation itself 
remained illegal; the last of those still behind bars regained their freedom in the general 
amnesty of 1975 (Ikhwanweb, 2010). Under Sadat the Brotherhood achieved a minor success 
with regard to their goals when Sadat officially reviewed Egyptian legislation. In accordance 
with this the constitution was amended in 1980 to state that Islamic Law “is the main source 
of law” (Ikhwanweb, 2010). These concessions by the government meant that the 
Brotherhood could favour a moderate stance and still achieve results. Sadat was assassinated 
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by the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Jihad in 1981 because of a peace agreement that he 
brokered between Israel and Egypt, which was seen as a failure to the Muslim world. 
For the 1980‟s and 1990‟s under the Egyptian leadership of Hosni Mubarak the Brotherhood 
continued to, as it still does, favour a moderate approach to achieving their goals. This is 
characterised by their attempts to infiltrate legal political parties, trade unions and various 
industries across Egypt to gain a stronger political foothold in Egypt. 
3.3.2 Targets: 
During a period of militancy after World War II the Brotherhood singled out a number of 
targets to achieve their goals (both violently and non-violently) through the use of their 
military wing the “Special Apparatus.” Internally, the unit was structured around cells which 
operated almost independently, with fighters not knowing about the activities of other 
clandestine cells (Zollner, 2009:13). This makes the activities of the group hard to account 
for, however the following list of offences were attributed to the Brotherhood and their 
military wing in 1948: an explosion outside the house of Mustapha El Nahas, president of the 
Wafd party (“Delegation Party”); the attempted bombing of the Sudan Agency, and; bombing 
of department stores of Ades, Ben Zion, Gettegno, the Delta Land Company
41
 and the Société 
Orientale de Publicité
42
 (New York Times, 1948). 
Also, on the 29 December 1948 the Egyptian Premier, Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, 
was assassinated by a student member of the Brotherhood, which the Premier had banned on 
8 December 1948. Also at this stage mass protests were held against the government ruling to 
ban the Brotherhood (New York Times, 1948). 
Zollner (2009:13) notes that during 1948 the struggle between the Brotherhood and the then 
ruling government accelerated into a state of near-persistent violence. This culminated in the 
dissolution order of 1948, Al-Banna‟s assassination in 1949, the public shaming of the 
Brotherhood in a number of military trials, and the persecution and torture of members, 
which left the organisation in a deep crisis. In this situation, the survival of the idea of this 
political–religious movement was at stake (Zollner, 2009:16). This ushered into notoriety a 
number of ideologues that would advance the group in a number of directions, one such 
ideologue was Qutb.  
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Whilst the influence of Qutb on the Brotherhood, circa 1960, can be debated, the 
Brotherhood nevertheless aligned themselves with the Free Officers in 1952 in a coup d'état 
to over throw the Egyptian government. This participation is similar to their contribution of 
fighters to the Palestinian uprising in 1936 and illustrated their desire for an Egypt (and her 
allies) free from the hold of foreign power as well as the rise of an Egyptian government that 
promotes Islamic Law.  
Whether the actions of the Brotherhood inspired Qutb‟s writings or visa-versa, is debatable 
but a corner stone of Qutb‟s ideology is the key concepts of jahiliyya (ignorance or the 
ignorant) and jihad (struggle). Upon these he builds a concise and uncomplicated 
interpretation. It emphasises that the true Muslim is obliged to counteract all non-Islamic 
influences, thus striving to implement hakimiyyat Allah (God‟s „absolute‟ authority). 
“Jahiliyya and hakimiyyat Allah are thus binary opposites and it is the duty of Muslims to 
engage in jihad to fight the first and to implement the latter” (Zollner, 2009:56). 
The execution of Qutb in 1966 made him a martyr for the cause giving the Brothers a clear 
sense of community and resistance. The Qutb legacy is also revered amongst both radicals 
and moderates (Zollner, 2009:45). Whilst this did not usher in a new phase of extreme 
violence within the Brotherhood (which had its own leadership struggles to contend with), 
Qutb‟s work serves as a basis for more radical members and groups that have emanated from 
Egypt and the Muslim world in the years after his death.  
Given the targets above, it is clear, as aligned with the group‟s goals, the Brotherhood 
targeted foreign interests as well as key government officials. It must be noted that this 
violence was only propagated with the failure of a political solution. Rationally it was 
perceived within the Brotherhood that extreme action against said targets will put pressure on 
them to leave the country (with regard to foreign business) or change policy (with regard to 
government officials).  
3.3.3 Tactics: 
The Brotherhood‟s tactics can be split into two clear paths as it emerged from World War II 
and as it entered the 21
st
 century – these are confrontationist and accommodationist 
respectively (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321). 
The confrontationist agenda has attributed to it an antidemocratic hostile philosophy that 
encourages violence and terrorism and poses a risk to both regional stability and Western 
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interests (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321). These factors make confrontationist terrorist groups a high 
political risk. 
 The immediate post-war period was when the Brotherhood was at its most violent peak. This 
was exacerbated by the situation in Egypt whereby the political elite had failed in its 
accommodation of Brotherhood ideology and proceeded to ban it. This exacerbated the 
asymmetry of power that already existed between the political elite and the Brotherhood. A 
growth in the asymmetry of power between forces makes it rational to use more 
unconventional methods to achieve preference outcomes or goals. This forced elements 
within the Brotherhood to adjust their tactics away from the political process towards protests 
and eventually violence – this is especially the case with the Brotherhood‟s “Special 
Apparatus.” 
After the assassination of al-Banna, and the rise of Qutb, as an ideological leader, this process 
of adjusting tactics to achieve preference outcomes was even more extreme such that it could 
not be contained within a single organised structure like the Brotherhood. Also members of 
the Brotherhood faced low rates of return and high rates of loss – given the steadfast nature of 
the Egyptian elite and the harsh measures that were enacted to curtail the Brotherhood.  
These factors prompted the emergence of organisations more ready to use and maintain a 
confrontationist approach outside of the limitations already set against the Brotherhood. Prior 
to this, however, the terror campaign conducted by the Brotherhood included, protests, 
bombings, assassinations and the contribution of fighters to war-like efforts and coups. 
With the formation of alternative groups to the Brotherhood, like Al-Jihad, the onus was no 
longer on the Brotherhood to act in a confrontationist way. More moderate members, the 
original core of the Brotherhood, could now stay within the group, and more fundamentalist 
members could start their own groups or join groups that promoted more confrontationist 
ideologies. 
In the latter half of the 20
th
 century the Brotherhood increasingly leaned towards an 
accommodationist approach decreasing their political risk. Accomodationists argue that 
hostility and violence are not inherent in Islamic movements and political and religious 
objectives can be achieved peacefully (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321). This approach taken by the 
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Brotherhood draws its concepts of non-violent opposition from al-Hudaybi‟s43 writing Du‟at 
la Qudat (Preachers not Judges). Although al-Hudaybi played a decisive role in the 
development of a conciliatory concept, which aims to gradually change the existing state 
system(s) toward an Islamic order, he is seldom given much Western scholarly attention 
when compared to al-Banna and Qutb (Zollner, 2009:146). Al-Banna and Qutb lived as 
activists, and their propagandist writings are used today to portray the Brotherhood‟s violent 
political engagements and creed, but less recognised is al-Hudaybi‟s theological and juridical 
approach. This has created a gap in descriptions of the Brotherhood, with the focus on Qutb 
and al-Banna providing little by way of explanation for the Brotherhood‟s accommodationist 
approach today (Zollner, 2009:146).  
The evolution of the Brotherhood throughout the 20
th
 century illustrates some of the core 
grievances, main goals, preferred targets and likely tactics for terror groups to come. In the 
context of the Brotherhood, their evolution as a political risk was within a politically unstable 
environment, which they both reacted to and fostered. It appears that harsh government 
reaction in fact aids terrorism rather than removes it, as is the case with the formation of Al-
Jihad as a reaction to the clamp down on the Brotherhood. Based on the goals, tactics and 
targets of the Brotherhood, they present a macro, transnational risk. This is in light of the fact 
that local and foreign were regarded as targets. Table 2 highlights the key findings with 
regard to the primary variables as they relate to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Table 2: Summary of Findings for the Muslim Brotherhood 
Group Goals Targets Tactics 
Muslim Brother- 
Hood  
(1945-2000) 
1) Islamic Law for the state 
2)  Removal of foreign 
influence 
The Egyptian State. 
Domestically located foreign 
influences. 
Protest, assassination, 
kidnapping, 
bombing. 
3.4 The Iranian Revolution: A Catalyst for Violence: 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was a watershed moment for Islamic fundamentalism and 
ushered in a wave of terrorism that was mostly Muslim in origin and exceedingly more 
transnational; spreading into Central Asia through the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, 
in the Middle East by animosity to American support of Israel, and inspired everywhere- 
from Algeria to Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines and beyond by pan-Islamic 
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dreams of uniting fundamentalist Muslim states, freed from Western cultural contamination, 
under Caliphate hegemony and Shari‟a law (Shughart, 2006:8).  
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was wholly unexpected (Rapoport, 2004:62). Ayatollah 
Khomeini's successful toppling of the Shah swept a Shi'a theocracy into power in Iran, 
subjecting the Iranian populace to a “dour, puritanical faith, policed by petty theocrats and 
religious commissars” (Zakaria, 2003:145).  
As it has been claimed by Rapoport (2004:62) Khomeini‟s reign “inspired and assisted” Shi'a 
terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon. Khomenini‟s reign was also 
heavily autocratic, anti-modernisation as well as anti-American. This stance is epitomised by 
Khomeini‟s reference to America as the “Great Satan” and the holding of fifty-two American 
hostages for more than 400 days in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979 (Milton-
Edwards, 2005:98). The revolution therefore had two notable effects: 1) it ushered in a 
government in Iran that was pro-fundamentalism, and 2) illustrated the fallibility of foreign 
interests in Muslim states.  
Apart from the Iranian Revolution and, what many fundamentalists (including the 
Brotherhood) saw as a capitulation to Israel – Egypt‟s treaty with Israel44 – there is another 
event that is also pivotal in galvanising Islamic fundamentalist ideals across the globe. This 
event is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. The Soviet invasion 
coupled with the Iranian Revolution, turned what was largely sporadic Islamic fundamentalist 
militancy into a future trend of full blown terrorism. In the context of Afghanistan, Afghan 
resistance to the Soviet invasion was aided by Western governments who sought to use 
Afghanistan as an extension of conflict against their Soviet enemy within the auspice of the 
Cold War (Milton-Edwards, 2005:97). Within this context what was a jihad against a foreign 
invader lead to further jihads as the pre-1990 Cold War world order collapsed. Terrorism in 
the 1980‟s and 1990‟s was thus facilitated by: the exposed vulnerability of certain states 
within the Arab world as failed or weak to competing rival forces and warlords, the number 
of ex-combatants and easy access to a wealth of arms and armoury, chronic economic 
underdevelopment, and intervention by external actors and backers - of which the West is a 
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 The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed by Egyptian President Sadat and Israel‟s Prime Minister Begin on 
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primary example. It is estimated that Western intelligence agencies trained and supported 
thousands of local Afghan and foreign Arab forces in the art of terrorism. Osama Bin Laden 
is widely acknowledged to have been aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 
Afghanistan (Milton-Edwards, 2005:98-99).  
Rapoport (2004) refers to the growing religious-based terrorism described above as part of 
the “fourth wave” of terrorism and found Islam to be at the centre of this terrorist trend. 
Enders and Sandler (2006:47) also make note of the gathering force that this “fourth wave” 
has attained in recent history, since 1979. The increase in accepted Islamic terrorist 
organisations since 1980 is demonstrated as follows: two of sixty-four groups in 1980, eleven 
of forty-eight groups in 1992, sixteen of forty-nine groups in 1994, and twenty-five of fifty-
eight groups in 1995. 
This trend demonstrates the increasing interconnectivity of fundamentalist ideas and ideology 
between Islamic fundamentalist groups across the globe, as well as the growing technological 
means to disseminate such ideas. It also indicates the inability of Western actors to 
effectively deter or prevent Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and illustrates that in some cases 
Western actors have in fact helped exacerbate the problem. An example of a group that took 
hold in the wake of the Iranian revolution is Hezbollah. 
3.5 Hezbollah – A Structural Overview: 
Hezbollah
45
 was inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Phillips, 2009:42) and formed in 
the wake of Lebanon‟s civil war. The civil war reflected the sectarian and civil dispute 
between the country‟s Muslim and Christian populations. As the state weakened this conflict 
was increasingly extended to non-state actors (Milton-Edwards, 2005:86). Within the power 
vacuum that formed external state actors were drawn into the conflict including Syria, Israel, 
France and the USA. Hezbollah, amid an increasingly more powerful Shi‟a community, 
formed as a direct response to the 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon
46
(Globalsecurity, 2010; 
Milton-Edwards, 2005:86).  
The movement was inspired by the teachings and actions of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran 
which is reflected in the leadership of the group as espoused by their spiritual figurehead 
Ayatollah Fadlallah. For Fadlallah, war, conflict and Israeli occupation demanded a dualist 
approach from the Shi‟a community and its leaders: resistance and social action (Milton-
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Edwards, 2005:87). To this end the group shared similar ideals to the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Egypt as reflected in a quotation by Fadlallah (cited in Milton-Edwards, 2005:87) “the 
occupation has to end and it can only do so by resistance...yet we have to support the 
community through health, educational and a social point of view, to prisoners and orphans 
etc.” 
Much like in Egypt with the Brotherhood, it was Hezbollah‟s attention to social upliftment as 
well as militant action against oppression and foreign influence that won the support of 
Muslim‟s within a politically unstable Lebanon. In spite of this, its links to Al-Jihad, the 
revolution in Iran and their attacks on Israel and other foreign actors define them as a terrorist 
group (Milton-Edwards, 2005:87). Though Hezbollah acts at a community level and from 
mostly within the confines of the Lebanese state it has a transnational organisational structure 
– “Hezbollah maintains a network of terrorist cells and training camps in Asia, Europe, and in 
South America where it uses the triple frontier of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay as a base of 
operations” (Phillips, 2009:41). Also its attacks levelled against Israel as well as the USA, 
France and other foreign entities that are deemed inappropriate make them a transnational 
terrorist group.  
In spite of its transnational character Hezbollah maintains a hierarchical organisational 
structure based on discipline and secrecy. According to Phillips (2009:41) Hezbollah is a 
coalition of Shi‟a clerics which fall under the Shura Council. This council is responsible for 
overall administration as well as executive, legislative, judicial, political and military affairs. 
Up until 1993 Iranian officials served on the Shura. Also under the command of the Shura 
Council is the General Secretariat comprising of various district heads, and the Politburo 
which is in charge of coordinating the activities of the Party Committees (e.g. Security, 
Propaganda, and the Combat Committee). 
3.5.1 Goals: 
The most direct evidence of the goals and objectives of Hezbollah appear in their founding 
letter, dated 16 February 1985, and entitled The Hizballah Program: an Open Letter to the 
Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World (Standwithus, 2010): 
“Let us put it truthfully: the sons of Hizhallah know who are their major enemies in 
the Middle East - the Phalanges
47
, Israel, France and the US. The sons of our umma 
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[community] are now in a state of growing confrontation with them, and will remain so until 
the realization of the following three objectives: (a) to expel the Americans. the French and 
their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land; (b) 
to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have 
perpetrated against Muslims and Christians; (c) to permit all the sons of our people to 
determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We 
call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of 
guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative 
attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country.” 
Hezbollah‟s goals can thus be broken down to reflect a number of fundamentalist ideals: self-
determination, formation of an Islamic state, Muslim state unification, a rejection of the state 
of Israel, and a desire to escape foreign influence. These goals can be broadly referred to as 
the creation of an Islamic state under Islamic Law and the removal of foreign influence. 
3.5.2 Targets: 
Hezbollah became infamous for three specific attacks during the 1980‟s. First was the 
hijacking of TWA flight 847 in which an American serviceman was killed. Also, the USA is 
widely perceived to have conceded to Hezbollah‟s demands due to the pressure that the USA 
put on Israel to release hundreds of prisoners in exchange for the hostages on the flight. 
Second, is the kidnapping of high profile Western targets. This had severe repercussions on 
USA foreign policy when it was exposed that the USA brokered arms-for-hostages. Thirdly, 
suicide bombings, with arguably the most successful example occurring on 23 October 1983. 
A suicide car bomb exploded outside an America Marine barracks near Beirut and killed 241 
off-duty American soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. On the same night, a similar 
explosive tactic was used to target and kill 58 French soldiers. This prompted the American 
and French withdrawal from the country (Richardson, 2006: 87-88).  
These targets show clear links to the organisations stated goals. With attacks being widely 
levelled against what Hezbollah perceives as „foreign invaders‟ in particular Israel and the 
USA. 
3.5.3 Tactics: 
Hezbollah uses an array of tactics, from kidnapping to suicide bombing. What can be noted is 
the progression and variation of attacks and the concessions made by political actors in 
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response to the attacks, especially suicide terrorism. Enders and Sandler (2006:48-49) report 
that there were 32 reported, domestic and transnational, terrorist attacks during the 1980‟s, 
109 in the 1990‟s, and 83 in the period 2000-2001. With the 1980‟s data being attributed 
mostly to Hezbollah and their campaign to remove foreign troops from Lebanon.  
According to Pape (2003:1) studies show that suicide terrorism follows a rational process, 
one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial 
concessions. Since the 1980‟s suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have 
learned that it works. Suicide terrorists, like those linked to Hezbollah, achieved in 
compelling American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces 
to leave Lebanon in 1985, and Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 
and 1995. Suicide terrorism is used because it works.  
Hezbollah has embraced this tactic through its ideological support for the idea of martyrdom 
which dates back to 680AD. As cited in Phillips (2009:42) “Hezbollah‟s strength resides in 
its ability to harness a hundred grievances to one sublime purpose, and to persuade its 
downtrodden adherents of their own strength – the strength of sacrifice.” According to 
Deputy General Sheik Naim Qasim, (cited in Phillips, 2009:42) “we do not call them suicide 
operations because suicide comes out of a loss of hope in life, while martyrdom is a love of 
life.” 
Another tactic utilised by Hezbollah is rocket attacks. This tactic utilises rockets/missiles 
largely supplied by Syria and Iran with an effective range of up to 120 miles. These 
rockets/missiles contain varying warheads (with varying damage potential) and can be fired 
from a shoulder held rocket launcher or in some case from more stable missile platforms. It is 
estimated that Hezbollah has fired some 4000 to 5000 rockets at Israel across the border, with 
varying results. This number of rockets only represents a third of Hezbollah‟s rocket potential 
(Sharp, 2006:10). 
Israel‟s retaliation is in some cases instant, but the mobility of the Hezbollah rockets makes 
them hard to pin-point, with Israeli attacks often inflicting more damage on civilians than 
actual Hezbollah targets. This prevents more damaging counter attacks from Israel as a 
negative global image encourages fundamentalist groups and can potentially lose Israel its 
allies. Accordingly rocket attacks remain an effective urban terror weapon for Hezbollah 
(Sharp, 2006:10). Also, the role of the Lebanese government in protecting its own sovereign 
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territory of which Hezbollah is a part of prevents more extreme foreign intervention and 
retaliation. 
From the above it is clear that Hezbollah presents a transnational, macro political risk. 
Having been aided and abetted by unstable states and encouraged by concessions made by 
their targets due to the extreme violence used in their attacks. Table 3 summarises the 
analysis of the primary variables as they relate to Hezbollah. 
Table 3: Summary of Findings for Hezbollah 
Group Goals Targets Tactics 
Hezbollah 
(1983-2000) 
1) Removal of foreign 
influence 
2) Islamic Law for the state  
The Lebanese state. Domestic 
and regionally located foreign 
influences. 
Assassination, 
Hijacking, Bombing 
(and rocket attacks), 
Suicide terrorism. 
3.6 Old Terrorism: 
Islamic fundamentalism in the post-War period is characterised by a number of goals, targets 
and tactics of which a number of trends can be extrapolated and discussed within a PRA 
context. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, like Hezbollah, has a number of common grievances. These 
grievances whilst initially directed at their own state were increasingly directed outwards at 
foreigners. Richardson (2006:95) refers to the common goals expressed amongst terrorist 
groups as the 3 R‟s – Revenge (for humiliation at the hand of foreign imperialism, and 
government exploitation), Renown (to illustrate the power of terrorism and the groups power 
to achieve its aims), and Reaction (to gain political ascendancy towards achieving their 
goals).  
The movement of action from the domestic to the transnational is represented by the 
increased likelihood of attack on foreign states and entities as well as the need to safe guard 
group interest (when under pressure from host governments), train new recruits, gather 
funding, and/or locate less protected targets. This trend began with the Brotherhood and 
became more expressive in the work of Hezbollah. The leadership structures of both groups 
are inherently hierarchical, however, due to persecution by legal and military forces, both the 
Brotherhood and Hezbollah tended to expand operations transnationally in search of safe 
operational areas, funding, training and/or targeting. This was especially the case for 
Hezbollah. This illustrates a growth in the macro risk of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. 
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In terms of tactics, there are a number of methods that have been employed throughout the 
period that have gathered notoriety. The Brotherhood, whilst oscillating between more 
fundamentalist and more moderate leadership tried both peacefully and violently to achieve 
its goal of an Islamic state free from foreign contamination. Where the political process 
failed, protests and then violence were used. Assassinations and bombings were their modus 
operandi of choice. However, with the moderate leadership having grown in stature within 
the group, and the rise of more militant organisations with similar aims, the Brotherhood no 
longer has to, or is willing to ply its violent trade which gave it notoriety during the late 
1940‟s. One however, cannot consider the Brotherhood in isolation. With the leadership 
expressing a more moderate approach to achieving political Islamic ideals there was a 
vacuum for more hard-line fundamentalists to fill. Consequently, with the growth of Islamic 
fundamentalist thought in Egypt, and the notoriety of ideologues like Qutb, other 
fundamentalist members of the Islamic faith took action to achieve what appears universal 
amongst fundamentalist groups – an Islamic state based on Islamic Law without foreign 
interference. 
Competing with this goal however, were the post-War efforts of liberal democracies to 
encourage constitutionalism and principles of democracy – along with all relevant 
institutions. This drew the Islamic fundamentalist groups into direct competition, in some 
cases with their own governments as well as with Western democracies – in particular the 
USA. Coupled with the communist rhetoric of the Cold War period the international scene 
was plagued by competing ideologies.  
This competition came to the fore during the Iranian Revolution which served as a defining 
moment in the eventual path of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 
for the remainder of the century. Most directly with the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
the terror campaign that Hezbollah still wages today in Lebanon against Israel, the Lebanese 
government and any foreign „invader‟ preventing it from uniting all Shi‟a Muslims under a 
new Islamic state. 
Coupled with this increase in terror came an increase in the means to achieve terrorist 
objectives. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well as the eventual collapse of the Soviet 
regime has guaranteed a continued supply of weapons to terrorist groups. Hezbollah‟s tactics 
include kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, bombings, rocket attacks, and most notable 
suicide bombing. 
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Most studies, when assessing the cost of terrorism make mention of incidents and casualties. 
If this were the case, the cumulative total of incidents for the period 1968 to 2003 would 
stand at 12,559, this according to the ITERATE
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 data featured in Enders and Sandler‟s book 
The Political Economy of Terrorism (2006:59). Prior to 1968, there were obviously terrorist 
events, as mentioned briefly, however they were ill documented and data is unreliable. 
Trends for the period 1968 to 2000, illustrate a spike in terrorist incidents in 1971, 1986, 
1991 and 1994 (Enders and Sandler, 2006:61). These spikes can be directly attributed to, the 
Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah‟s campaign against the USA, France and Israel, and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union post-1990.  
Old terrorism is thus, domestic and transnational, increasingly violent, varied and effective. 
Terrorist organisations operate in a hierarchal structure as well as increasingly loose 
transnational networks. This is demonstrated by the hierarchical decision-making structure in 
both the Brotherhood and Hezbollah, with dissemination of the groups practices and organs 
of operation all over the world; particularly Latin America for Hezbollah. They continually 
seek out more effective and devastating weapons and strike where the likelihood of 
retaliation is minimal. This concept of old terrorism will be contrasted with so-called new 
terrorism in the period 2001 – 2009 as discussed further on in this chapter. 
3.7 Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism Post-9/11: 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations like the Brotherhood and Hezbollah have 
survived a number of strategies to combat them and remain active in the 21
st
 century. This 
brings them into the post-9/11 analysis. They will however only be referred to in brief as the 
main focus of this time period is al-Qaeda. 
More recently the Brotherhood has expanded outside the Middle East into the USA. Activists 
affiliated with the Brotherhood have founded the Muslim Students‟ Association, the North 
American Islamic Trust, the Islamic Society of North America, the American Muslim 
Council, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought. The Brotherhood also reportedly 
exercises a strong influence in Muslim communities throughout Europe 
(Discoverthenetworks, 2010). 
Originally conceived to follow the teachings of the Prophet the Brotherhood‟s ideals have 
ebbed and flowed throughout the last several decades reflecting the views of both extremist 
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and more moderate leaders (Phillips, 2009:7).  A number of figures in contemporary terrorist 
groups are from the ranks of the Brotherhood, notably: the late Mohammed Atef, Osama bin-
Laden‟s military commander, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda‟s political ideologue and 
former leader of Al-Jihad. Also worthy of mention are the many members of the more 
militant Gammaa al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group) and Al-Jihad as well as Al-Takfir wal-
Hijra (Excommunication and Migration) (Aboul-Enein, 2003:26). Hamas to this day also 
maintains that the organisation is a branch of the Brotherhood (Phillips, 2009:75). The 
Brotherhood presently has some two million active followers and three million supporters 
among Egypt‟s population of 74 million (Phillips, 2009:7) which illustrates a growth in 
popularity. 
More recently the Brotherhood is characterised as a moderate fundamentalist group and have 
denounced the use of violence. Chairman of Muslim Brotherhood Political Department, Dr. 
Mohamed Morsi is quoted in a 2008 article as follows (Ztruth, 2008): 
“Immediately after the 9/11 attacks that happened six years ago, the Muslim 
Brotherhood group condemned them, seeing them as totally divorced from any religion or 
creed, actions which are totally rejected by Islam.”  
Morsi goes on to say that:   
“The Muslim Brotherhood has a moderate attitude. We reject and don‟t commit violence. We 
also condemn what the US did before 9/11, after 9/11 and its current terrorism against 
mankind.” 
This quotation illustrates a tactical division from the Brotherhood of the old terrorism era. 
The Brotherhood having once used violence to achieve its aims has now sought out a more 
moderate and political way to achieve their goals. However, this is largely due to perceived 
successes versus severe failures – the recognition of Islamic Law within the Egyptian 
constitution and the inclusion of certain Brotherhood members into the Egyptian business 
community versus the history of violence perpetrated against the organisation by the 
Egyptian government especially during the 1940‟s and 1950‟s which lead to the near collapse 
of the organisation. Also, the growth in the number of more militant organisations both in 
Egypt and throughout the Muslim world have allowed members of the Brotherhood who do 
not want to remain moderate the ability to join more radical groups. 
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Hezbollah as of 2001 has maintained much of its 1980‟s and 1990‟s character. Even after 
9/11 the USA remains concerned about threats from Hezbollah. In 2002 USA Deputy 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley warned of Hezbollah “dormant cells” in the USA. 
Other top officials have also warned that Hezbollah may in fact be the “A team of terrorists” 
while al-Qaeda is the so-called “B team” (cited in Phillips, 2009:47). 
Perhaps the greatest illustration of Hezbollah‟s power came with the thirty-four day war 
between Lebanon and Israel in 2006. Hezbollah gained a great deal of public support as the 
war escalated, particularly as Israeli Defence Force mechanised units and infantry crossed the 
border into southern Lebanon – a chief location of Hezbollah. These Israeli forces coupled 
with the Israeli air bombardment killed numerous civilians and devastated southern Lebanon. 
According to Phillips (2009:51) “the war forged a sense of social cohesion and common 
purpose among Lebanon‟s factions united by the view of Israel as the common enemy.” 
The war also did little to hamper persistent attacks by Hezbollah forces. These forces fired 
numerous rockets at Haifa and the towns of Galilee. Hezbollah leadership also promised to 
attack Tel Aviv with long range Iranian Zelzal missiles. Hezbollah‟s forces effectively halted 
the Israeli Defence Force advance and they got bogged down in Southern Lebanon. This lead 
to increasingly violent attacks from Israel on Lebanon which lost Israel a great deal of 
diplomatic support – especially after Israel‟s use of cluster bombs in the final days of the war 
(Phillips, 2009:51). 
In 2008 Hezbollah were given enough cabinet seats in Lebanon‟s parliament to veto any 
decision and to avert civil war, however, Hezbollah have not disarmed. Rather Hezbollah has 
pledged not to use its arsenal against the Lebanese. Operations in Israel however, still persist 
either directly or through the aiding and abetting of pro-Palestine groups (Phillips, 2009:49-
53). In spite of Hezbollah‟s activities, arguably, the most notorious terrorist group of the 21st 
century is al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda will now be discussed as the primary case study of the period 
2001-2009. 
3.8 Al-Qaeda – A Structural Overview 
The present understanding of al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation, with Osama Bin Laden as 
its leader, is a gross simplification of what al-Qaeda actually is, and how it operates. Rather, 
al-Qaeda (as a group), and Osama bin Laden, form only one component of the movement. Al-
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden represent the symbol, the figurehead, and the main nodes of a 
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vast network of terrorist groups each with similar, as well as, contrasting ideals (Castells, 
2004:110; Burke, 2007:2; Katzman, 2005:1). To gain a further understanding it is important 
to briefly look at the historical development of what is currently understood to be al-Qaeda. 
The word “al-qaeda” comes from the root word in Arabic qaf-ayn-dal. It has various 
meanings, and most commonly refers to a base, as in a camp or a home. It can also refer to a 
foundation, as in a foundation of a building. Crucially however, it can also mean a precept, 
rule, principle, maxim, formula, method and/or model pattern (Burke, 2007:1).  
There is little doubt that the word was used by Muslim fighters in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet invasion –to describe the base from which they operate. However, the word “al-qaeda” 
was also used by the more extreme elements of the fighters against the Soviets. In this case, 
Abdallah Azzam, a chief ideologue of non-Afghan Muslims fighting alongside the Afghans. 
Azzam used the word to describe the role he envisaged for the most committed fighters after 
the war (Burke, 2007:2). 
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 Abdallah Azzam, a chief ideologue of the 
non-Afghan militants, and mentor to bin Laden, used the following words to describe the role 
he envisaged for the most committed Muslim fighters (Burke, 2007:2):  
 “Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and [to] put up with heavy tasks 
and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not 
require...a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory...It carries 
the flag all along the sheer, endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the 
reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make and manifest itself. This vanguard 
constitutes the strong foundation (al-qaeda al-sulbah) for the expected society.” 
To Azzam „al-qaeda‟ represented a base from which individuals committed to the cause of 
Islam would, through the cumulative weight of all their actions, bring about great change to 
the world. Al-Qaeda (the group) thus represents the revolutionary „vanguard of the strong‟ 
that would unite and mobilise Islamic fundamentalist principles throughout the Islamic world 
(Burke, 2007:2). 
Following the teachings of Azzam, bin Laden carried his ideology with him throughout the 
1980‟s and beyond. Bin Laden was initially associated with the Muslim Brotherhood 
however, upon the formation of al-Qaeda in the mid-1980‟s, the Muslim Brotherhood broke 
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off its links with bin Laden. In spite of this bin Laden remained a devoted adherent to the 
teachings and influence of Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb who authored Sign 
Posts on the Road and was an integral part of the Brotherhood ideology.  
Reflecting influences from both the Qutb brothers as well as the ideological teachings of 
Azzam, the original conception of al-Qaeda was that of a “base” that would bring together 
different Islamic fundamentalist groups and co-ordinate their activities towards expelling 
foreign influence of all types (Hellmich, 2005:43). 
Initially, al-Qaeda had very little support due to key disagreements about the scope of action 
for the collective. This is epitomised by the failure of the meeting between al-Qaeda 
leadership and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Afghanistan in 
1988. The primary view or most Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation during the 
1980‟s, according to Hellmich (2005: 43) was that action should be confined to each groups‟ 
nation-state. However, this began to change when Ayyman al-Zawahiri joined the ranks of 
the al-Qaeda movement. 
Along with bin Laden, al-Zawahiri believed that domestic efforts of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups were being hampered by a larger external enemy. This enemy was the USA because 
of its support for Israel and for the corrupt dictatorships of the Middle East especially in 
Saudi Arabia. In order to project this message and gather support al-Qaeda leaders conducted 
sophisticated public relations and media campaigns through the use of a series of faxed 
statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet postings throughout the 1990‟s 
(Blanchard, 2007:1). The main achievement of these postings and a signal of unity 
established between fundamentalist groups was achieved in 1998 through a signed agreement 
between various Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups; The World Islamic Front for the 
Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders (al-Jabbah al-Islamiyyah al-„Alamiyyah Li-Qital 
al-Yahud Wal-Salibiyyin). This agreement was established by bin Laden as the figurehead of 
the al-Qaeda movement; al-Zawahiri, on behalf of the Egyptian group Al-Jihad; Shayyakh 
Mir Hamazah, representing Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; Fazlul Rahman, of the Jihad 
Movement of Bangladesh, as well as a number of undisclosed signatories (Castells, 
2004:110-111). It is this agreement that has largely characterised al-Qaeda as popularly 
conceived in the 21
st
 century.  
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According to Katzman (2005:7-8) there are a number of other groups that were part of the al-
Qaeda coalition before 9/11, and to varying degrees are still associated with al-Qaeda today. 
These groups are: the Islamic Group and Al-Jihad (Egypt) - al-Zawahiri was the operational 
and political leader of Al-Jihad before he merged it with al-Qaeda in 1998; the Armed 
Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria); the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU); the Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia) – allegedly responsible for the Bali 
nightclub attacks in 2002 that killed 180 people; the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; Harakat 
ul-Mujahedin, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Kamshmiri 
militant groups based in Pakistan; and Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon)
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Al-Qaeda, the organisation, regardless of the loose networks of affiliates, has a core structure 
with several subordinate committees and cells. Bin Laden resides at the top of the structure as 
the figurehead and transnational representative. Assisting bin Laden is a consultative council 
which gather information on planned and ongoing operations. A loose configuration of 
further sub-committees and cells provides further information in this regard (Kalic, 2010:3).  
 Al-Qaeda thus refers to both an overarching ideological construct that is the “revolutionary 
vanguard of the strong” as well as a group both in a singular and networked capacity. In spite 
of this multitude of conceptual understandings al-Qaeda can still be considered a group for 
analysis in this research study since as an ideological entity it encourages specific goals, 
tactics and targets which either it or its affiliates carry out. Al-Qaeda‟s ideology has been 
expressed through sophisticated public and media relations since the mid-1990‟s. These have 
been document by Blanchard (2007) and represent the core goals of what is commonly 
referred to as the group (or network of groups) al-Qaeda. 
3.8.1 Goals: 
Bin Laden and other leading al-Qaeda figures have continually referred to their statements as 
important primary sources in seeking to understand the group‟s ideology and political goals. 
In this regard the primary goals of al-Qaeda can be traced to the period 1994-2001 in which 
al-Qaeda first began to assert itself through its numerous declarations in response to non-
Muslim interference in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War (Blanchard, 2007:2).  
In 1996 bin Laden issued a “declaration of jihad” against the USA, this was emotively 
referred to as the “Islamic resistance to the alliance of Jews, Christians and their agents.” This 
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declaration largely stemmed from grievances associated with the international climate at the 
time. Al-Qaeda thus came to represent opposition to the US military presence in Saudi 
Arabia, the international sanctions regime on Iraq, and the US support of Israel. Bin Laden‟s 
declaration also cited “massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, 
Fatani, Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina” as examples of the 
war already being waged against Islam (Blanchard, 2007:2-3). 
The above declaration was further ratified by al-Qaeda‟s fatwa issued in 1998 in which bin 
Laden is quoted as follows: “For seven years the United States has been occupying the lands 
of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its 
rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsula 
into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples” (Richardson, 
2006:127). 
These goals, to redress Muslim humiliation and expel foreign influence were officially 
adopted by al-Qaeda, its members and affiliates in “The World Islamic Front for Jihad 
against the Jews and Crusaders” that same year. Also, in 1998, al-Qaeda was involved in the 
simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the attack on 
the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. While bin Laden denied direct responsibility he approved of 
the attacks and argued that the bombings should be seen by Americans and the world as 
retribution for US policy (Blanchard, 2007:4). 
The most infamous attack associated with al-Qaeda however, remains 9/11. Without dwelling 
on 9/11, bin Laden, among other members, issued a number of statements confirming al-
Qaeda‟s responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. Bin Laden also repeated his claim to strike further 
American targets (Blanchard, 2007:4). Then later in 2001 al-Zawahiri issued a further 
statement which listed the “tools” adopted by “the Western forces” to fight Islam: (1) The 
United Nations, (2) The friendly rulers of Muslim peoples. (3) The multinational 
corporations. (4) The international communications and data exchange systems. (5) The 
international news agencies and satellite media channels. (6) The international relief agencies 
(Burke, 2007:23-24). 
Further al-Qaeda material discovered in the form of tapes of al-Zawahiri in 2005 list what he 
refers to as “three foundations” of the al-Qaeda goals and ideology. These tapes represent the 
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clearest articulation of al-Qaeda‟s goals in the 21st century. These are cited in Blanchard 
(2007:10-11) and are as follows: 
1) “The Quran Based Authority to Govern”. According to al-Zawahiri al-Qaeda 
advocates the creation of a Muslim state governed by Islamic Law. Secular 
government or “man-made” government is not an option and is represented as 
contradicting the Islamic faith. 
2) “The Liberation of the Homelands”. This principle argues that reforms and free 
elections will not be possible until “the freedom of the Muslim lands and their 
liberation from every aggressor” is achieved. Al-Zawahiri also emphasised concern 
over the Middle East‟s energy resources and described the Middle East as “exposed 
and impotent to the Israeli nuclear arsenal.” 
3) “The Liberation of the Human Being”. This emphasises a contractual social 
relationship between Muslims and their rulers. It also demanded that Muslims fight to 
overthrow rulers who violate Islamic Laws. He criticised hereditary government and 
noted that Muslim government needs “to specify the power of [an Islamic Law] based 
judiciary, and insure that no one can dispose of the people‟s rights except in 
accordance with this judiciary.” 
These goals and statements broadly outline the main targets of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The 
overarching message or goal that is conveyed is based on a real (or perceived) grievance with 
Western interference in the Middle East. Furthermore, the goals are issued in such as way as 
to convey the grievances in vocabulary that emphasizes the unity of the Muslim world versus 
their apparent Western aggressors. The goals create an „other‟ – this helps attract group 
members and justify group actions.  This is evident in the use of words like “homeland”, “the 
Western Forces”, and continued reference to “Muslims” as a collective rather than 
exclusively al-Qaeda. 
3.8.2 Targets: 
From the stated goals there are, broadly speaking, two primary targets: 1) the Western world 
– more specifically the USA, and 2) non-believers of, or within, the Islamic faith.  
The targeting of the Western world stems from a real fear of liberal theory which is 
interpreted by lay preaches and teaches in mosques as the foundation of a Western conspiracy 
to dominate and make subservient the Muslim people. This struggle has deepened since 9/11 
when bin Laden and al-Qaeda claimed to speak in the name of Islam. The  “war on terrorism” 
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has done little to alter this perception and it is generally perceived by al-Qaeda and a growing 
number of Muslims as a war on Islam, especially since the original motive for war - Weapons 
of Mass Destruction - have yet to be discovered (Milton-Edwards, 2005:126). 
The most notorious impact of this targeting is 9/11 in which the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon were hit by passenger airlines. This imposed immediate costs exceeding $100 
billion, in the form of property damage and lives lost, and up to $2 trillion in lower future 
corporate profits (Navarro and Spencer, 2001 cited in Shughart, 2002:6).  
Since 9/11 a vast number of attacks have been linked to al-Qaeda either directly or indirectly 
(through its affiliates). However, unless a terrorist group takes responsibility for an attack, 
attributing attacks to groups is speculative. Some notable attacks are listed below: 
22 November 2002: al-Qaeda reportedly bombed an Israeli owned/patronized hotel in 
Mombasa Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Simultaneously, al-Qaeda also reportedly tried 
to shoot down an Israeli charted plane using a surface-to-air missile at the Mombasa airport 
in Kenya (Cronin, 2004:4).  
16 May 2003: Fourteen suicide bombers, members of a local group (Salafia Jihadia) allegedly 
connected to al-Qaeda, carried out nearly simultaneous attacks on five Western and Jewish 
targets in Casablanca, killing 45 people and injuring more than 100 (Cronin, 2004:4). 
11 March 2004: Simultaneous bombings of four packed commuter trains in Madrid killed 
190 people and injured more than 1400. Evidence is still being gathered; however, Spanish 
police have in custody a number of Moroccan and other Islamist radicals who are reportedly 
members of the group Salafia Jihadia. A self described spokesperson for al-Qaeda claimed 
the organisations responsibility for the attacks although that has not been confirmed (Cronin, 
2004:4). 
7 July 2005: Three simultaneous explosions on the London Underground as well as an 
explosion on a double-decker bus kill more than 30 people and leave more than 700 injured 
(BBC, 2005:1). Al-Qaeda claim responsibility for the suicide attacks in September 2005 and 
denounce Britain for the “historical crime of setting up Israel and the continuing crimes in 
Afghanistan and Iraq” (BBC, 2005a:1). 
The incidents above deliberately exclude ongoing al-Qaeda attacks and operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq since terrorist activity is defined herein by the use of violence against 
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non-combatants and to make such distinctions in a theatre of war is problematic. However, it 
must be stressed that the attacks highlighted above still represent a small percentage of 
attacks by al-Qaeda and groups linked with it. The website The Religion of Peace (2010) 
reports that some 15782 deadly Islamic fundamentalist terrorist attacks have been carried out 
since 9/11. This figure does not only refer to al-Qaeda but it also gives an indication of the 
severity of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the period 2001-2009. 
A clear trend illustrated above is the targeting of Western interests and citizens both locally 
and transnationally. Worth mentioning is the fixation on the USA and Britain. This is even 
more likely given the involvement of British and American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
3.8.3 Tactics: 
From the examples above the primary methods and tactics employed by al-Qaeda in the 
period 2001-2009 can be extrapolated. To this end, two noticeable trends stand out: 1) 
bombing, and 2) suicide terrorism. These tactics are accounted for by Enders and Sandler 
(2006:190) who note that as a consequence of the high costs (leadership and resources) 
associated with hostage taking, assassinations and hijacking, the al-Qaeda network has turned 
to logistically simple, but deadly, bombing. This is especially in light of the high number of 
losses that the group has suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of the war on terror. 
Further factors inhibiting tactic selection are the counter-terrorism measures taken in the 
wake of 9/11. These measures have reduced the effectiveness of tactics like hijacking, 
hostage taking and assassinations. Measures in the USA, described by Manning (2006:458) 
include:  
1) New procedures for issuing visas and granting students permission to study in the 
USA 
2) Placing armed air marshals on both domestic US flights and international flights 
between the USA and Canada. 
3) Revising procedures for screening passengers prior to boarding aircraft. 
4) Designing and integrating extensive and growing databases for tracking visitors and 
US citizens. 
5) Consolidating a number of US agencies into a Department of Homeland Security 
6) Legislating the “PATRIOT Act” giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
wide and unprecedented access to previously private places, spaces and documents. 
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A rational response to increased USA security measures by al-Qaeda is illustrated by the 
tactic of bombing Western targets outside of the USA where security measures are not as 
well enforced. This maintains a high casualty ratio and requires very minimal costs to the 
terrorist organisation – even when suicide terrorism is used (Pape, 2003). This is reiterated by 
Enders and Sandler (2006:193) who note that increased security in wealthy nations have had 
unintended negative consequences by inducing terrorists to stage their attacks in countries 
less able to afford widespread defensive measures – this is because terrorists weigh the costs, 
risks and benefits when choosing the venue for attack.  
Also interesting to note is an upward trend in the lethality of incidents. A terrorist incident in 
the post-2000 era is now 17 percentage points more likely to result in death or injury (Enders 
and Sandler, 2006a:307). However, the problem with such claims is that rather than 
representing an average growth, the statistics are heavily influenced by high casualty events. 
High casualty events skew terrorism casualty trends upwards. Also, the statistics employed 
by Enders and Sandler is based on media reports who often only report on the most 
sensational of events since they are the most likely to guarantee readership (Frey et al, 
2004:4). In spite of this however, the point remains that there have been a number of high 
casualty events in the post-9/11 era, which apart from 9/11 itself have been as a result of 
bombing and suicide terrorism. 
The overarching tactical strategy of al-Qaeda post-9/11 is thus, bombings and suicide terror, 
aimed at Western interests and proxies in countries with insufficient security measures. This 
is illustrated by attacks in countries with relatively low-income as a percentage of GDP (gross 
domestic product) like in Kenya and Morocco, as previously discussed. 
Table 4 summarises the analysis of the primary variables as they relate to al-Qaeda. 
Table 4: Summary of findings for al-Qaeda 
Group Goals Targets Tactics 
Al-Qaeda 
(2001-2009) 
1) Removal of foreign 
influence   
2) Islamic Law for the all 
Muslim lands 
Domestic and transnationally 
located foreign influences – 
especially the USA.  
False Islamic states. 
Bombing and suicide 
terrorism. 
3.9 New Terrorism: 
Most notable in the so-called new terrorism period of 2001-2009 is indeed the network of 
networks that is represented by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda as discussed is essentially a collective of 
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congruent transnational groups which share the same core ideals and interact with one 
another in terms of planning, financing and/or joint attacks. Also, given the increase of more 
costly and efficient security measures in more advanced Western societies (the USA is a case 
in point) the transnationalisation of terrorism has become a necessary feature of the terrorist 
landscape as terrorist groups adjust their targets and tactics in terms of access to resources, 
leadership and the likelihood of success. 
Two primary goals can be highlighted from the analysis herein these are the creation of the 
Islamic state under Islamic Law and the removal of foreign influence from Muslim lands. 
However, due to the increased security apparatus in preventing terrorism in certain areas and 
not others, coupled with the transnational nature of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism these 
goals are now being enacted through indirect targets – for example Western interests and 
citizens are now being targeted internationally rather than domestically. 
Much like the proxy wars between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is occurring outside of the country from which the groups 
grievances originate. Targets are now being located outside of the traditional Western 
„empire‟ – the USA and Europe. Accordingly, areas of increasing concern for Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism are less-developed countries especially in the Middle East, South 
East Asia and Africa. 
With regard to tactics the tendency has leaned towards bombings and suicide terrorism. This 
usually entails high degrees of destruction and increased casualties. 
3.10 Conclusion: 
Scorn for false-Muslims began with fundamentalists attacking their own governments who 
were largely considered “autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed.” They were also considered 
“more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic” than the true believers would prefer (Zakaria, 2003: 
120and125). These factors lead to a number of key instances in the development of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism throughout the period 1945-2000. The first instance and group 
discussed herein is a case in point – the Muslim Brotherhood. The second instance is the 
overthrow of the Shah, by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979.  
These instances represent the nationalist as well as the fundamentalist trend within the given 
time period. They represent the need for Islamic fundamentalists to unite nationalism with 
theology, the state with religion, and politics with Islam. 
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With the growing desire amongst so-called true believers to achieve a unification of the state 
and Islam, a need to rid Muslim states of foreign influence also developed. This was gradual 
at first and then accelerated with the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Hezbollah eventually emerged within Lebanon to carry on the goals for a united 
Shari‟s Islamic world free from foreign intervention. Subsequently, there began a bloody 
campaign of terrorist events perpetrated famously against the USA, France and Israel. 
The defining characteristics for old terrorism are however not static. Beginning in 1945 goals 
and groups were domestically orientated, however, with a successful revolution in Iran, the 
transnational nature of terrorism emerged, first in Iran, then in Afghanistan. 
The groups discussed within this period both have political and militant wings - each of 
which were used to gain local support and achieve moderate political concessions without 
violence. However, with the failure of the political process in most instances and the 
demonstrated success of terrorist tactics, the rational choice was for the use of violence to 
achieve group goals. This rationality is driven by an ideology and fundamentalism which at 
its core tends towards violence to achieve political-religious outcomes.   
The period 2001-2009 is characterised, simultaneously by a group structure that at its core 
operates transnationally and by a growing security environment that encourages the need for 
increasingly transnational operations. 
Al-Qaeda by design is a transnational network of networks. The immediate structure of al-
Qaeda is hierarchical, however it has a number of independent organisational nodes and 
affiliates that share similar ideals however; they maintain their own organisational identity 
and structure. Therefore as much as an organisation is affiliated to al-Qaeda, and regardless 
of its operations, it is still independent from most of the hierarchical processes that govern al-
Qaeda. 
With regard to the goals of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the period there is a primacy 
given to combating the West as a means to establish the secondary objective – the Muslim 
state under Islamic Law. A by-product of these initial goals is the liberation of Muslim lands 
from foreign intervention and exploitation. 
The primary target of al-Qaeda in the struggle to achieve its stated goals, is the USA. The 
USA represents an embodiment of the West, of Western liberal policy and institutions. This 
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does however extend to other Western nations, in particular Britain. A further target is Israel 
as a product of the West and as a primary culprit in the oppression of the Muslim people, 
especially Palestine. 
The tactics used against said targets have become increasingly cost-effective and damaging. 
In this case bombing and suicide terrorism are used extensively. This is representative of the 
historical success of violent terrorism, in particular the use of suicide terrorism and bombing 
by Hezbollah, and the rational progression of tactics to account for changing dynamics in the 
operational environment. These changes are encouraged by the “war on terror” and other 
counterterrorist measures that have adjusted Islamic fundamentalist terrorist preferences 
accordingly. 
Chapter 4 will now juxtapose old terrorism with new terrorism in an effort to answer the 
research questions set out in within this research paper.
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Chapter 4: Findings and Discussions of the Research Study 
4.1 Introduction: 
This chapter will set about analysing the data from chapter 3. This analysis will highlight the 
key characterises of old and new terrorism. For this purpose the primary variables goals, 
tactics and targets will be discussed. From this analysis an argument will be constructed 
against the novelty and value of new terrorism as a concept for analysis in PRA. 
This argument will be bolster by Table 5 which highlights the primary variables for analysis 
from the previous chapter. Table 5 presents a summary of the most important findings 
associated with each variable, and presents them in such a way that old and new terrorism 
can be more readily compared. 
After the initial variable analysis, a second section will discuss a proposed secondary 
variable: structure, as it relates to both old and new terrorism. This variable was discovered 
to be important through the research conducted herein. This discovery was made through the 
process of describing the structural overview of the Islamic fundamentalist groups that are 
used as examples herein. What started out as a means to introduce the reader to the terrorist 
group as a whole was instead revealed to be a secondary means through which the Islamic 
fundamentalist groups could be compared. 
Through the variable analysis, and the subsequent analysis of old and new terrorism critical 
comments can be made on the value of new terrorism within the field of PRA. In closing a 
normative concept of terrorism will be constructed out of the most valuable findings from 
within this research study. This concept is such that it best serves PRA‟s objective of risk 
analysis and risk mitigation. 
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4.2 Old and New Terrorism within a Rational Choice Framework: 
Table 5: Variable Comparisons for Selected Islamic Fundamentalists Groups 
Group Goals Targets Tactics 
Muslim Brother- 
Hood  
(1945-2000) 
1) Islamic Law for the state 
2)  Removal of foreign 
influence 
The Egyptian State. 
Domestically located foreign 
influences. 
Protest, assassination, 
kidnapping, 
bombing. 
Hezbollah 
(1983-2000) 
1) Removal of foreign 
influence 
2) Islamic Law for the state  
The Lebanese state. 
Domestic and regionally 
located foreign influences. 
Assassination, 
Hijacking, Bombing 
(and rocket attacks), 
Suicide terrorism. 
Al-Qaeda 
(2001-2009) 
1) Removal of foreign 
influence   
2) Islamic Law for the all 
Muslim lands 
Domestic and transnationally 
located foreign influences – 
especially the USA.  
False Islamic states. 
Bombing and suicide 
terrorism. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the key findings from chapter 3 with regards to each terrorist group, as 
well as from each time period. From this table a number of characteristics and discussion 
points are present with regard to each individual terrorist group, the time period they are from 
and the conceptualisation of terrorism (old or new) that they represent. 
4.2.1 Goals: 
The first variable for discussion in Table 5 is the goals of the organisations. There are two 
main goals shared between Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations: 1) the creation of 
the Islamic state under Islamic law, and 2) the removal of foreign influence.  
The Brotherhood placed a great deal of primacy on the adoption of Islamic Law in Egypt, 
with a secondary goal being the removal of foreign influence from the domestic sphere. 
However, advancing past the Iranian Revolution to the establishment of Hezbollah, more 
emphasis was placed on the removal of foreign influence in domestic affairs, with the 
creation of the Islamic state in Lebanon being a secondary goal.  
Old terrorism is thus defined by the creation of the Islamic state, as well as the removal of 
foreign influence. 
Al-Qaeda‟s goal orientation is primarily aimed at the removal of foreign influence since 
foreign actors are perceived by al-Qaeda as the greatest obstacles to the realisation of the 
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Islamic state. The goal of the Islamic state under Islamic law is also transnationally applied 
across all Muslim dominant nations. A possible explanation for this transnational application 
of goals within the auspice of new terrorism lies within the network structure of al-Qaeda and 
its broad base of affiliates. These affiliated groups operate in numerous countries throughout 
the world pursuing similar goals – this gives rise to the transnational nature of what are 
generally very traditional and old Islamic fundamentalist goals. 
New terrorism is thus also defined by the creation of the Islamic state, as well as the removal 
of foreign influence. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the goal orientation of these fundamentalist groups is 
that there is nothing significantly novel about new terrorism‟s goals. The period of old 
terrorism sought to simultaneously remove foreign influence and achieve the Islamic state, 
whilst new terrorism sees the removal of foreign influence as a necessary means to achieve 
the realisation of the Islamic state under Islamic Law. The application of new terrorism‟s 
goals transnationally is more reflective of the interlinked and transnational number of groups, 
rather than novelty on the part of goal selection. The fact remains however, that new 
terrorism and old terrorism share congruent goals.  
4.2.2 Targets 
Based on the analysis of the goals in Table 5 as well as extensive group analysis there are two 
main targets that the Islamic fundamentalist groups within this research study pursue: 1) local 
government officials, and 2) foreign actors. 
Hough (2005) notes that new terrorism is characterised by the increased number of casualties 
that terrorist organisations try to inflict. This speaks, not only to their targeting of foreigners, 
but also to their tactics. 
The increase in the number of casualties in the new terrorism period is largely due to the 
number of affiliated groups in the new terrorism time period. The more groups pursuing the 
same goals and targets the more incidents there are likely to be and therefore the greater the 
chance of casualties. These groups are largely defined by al-Qaeda. This has contributed to 
the classification of new terrorism as increasingly violent.  
This classification is, however, also influenced by a number of other factors. Firstly, foreign 
actors as targets represent a much larger pool of targets for potential attack than do local 
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government actors, therefore it seems logical that terrorist groups attack and kill more foreign 
actors. Secondly, as discussed in the previous section the goal orientation of new terrorism 
means that foreign targets are perceived as a barrier to the Islamic state - when considering 
that a growing number of groups share similar views this compounds the violence as more 
foreign actors are targeted by an increasing number of Islamic fundamentalist groups. 
In spite of this upward trend, it would be remiss not to consider similar upward trends in the 
old terrorism time period too. Notable periods of increasing violence against foreign targets 
also occurred during the early 1980‟s and 1990‟s. When analysed as a trend, increases in 
violence occur periodically in both time periods. The increase in violence in the new 
terrorism time period is therefore not a novelty. 
In conclusion, the targets of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups have remained the same 
in both time periods – government officials and foreign actors. The degree of violence is not 
a novelty because similar increases in casualties occurred throughout the 1980‟s and 1990‟s 
when foreign targets were priority targets. 
4.2.3 Tactics: 
Table 5 highlights al-Qaeda‟s use of bombing and suicide terrorism as primary tactics. Enders 
and Sandler (2006:61-62) note that a typical bombing incident is not complex and requires far 
less terrorist resources in contrast to more costly, and generally less destructive tactics like 
kidnappings, assassinations and hijackings. Also tactics like kidnapping, assassination and 
hijacking are presently more effectively mitigated against as discussed in Manning (2006) 
and Spencer (2001) who note that more proactive measures in airport security, better security 
of key personal and state counter-terrorism information sharing have led terrorists to more 
cost effective measures. 
The cost effectiveness of bombing, as a “hit and run tactic” means that trends in bombings 
can increase drastically in any given period. This is true for the period in which new 
terrorism is defined - 2001 onwards. Enders and Sandler (2006:62), through the analysis of 
the ITERATE data, note that the proportion of bombings relative to the total number of 
terrorist incidents has increased sharply since 2001 – a trend that they have largely attributed 
to al-Qaeda. Occurring simultaneously with the increased use of bombing as a tactic, is the 
rise in deaths and casualties. Thus, given that the pool of targets has increased (foreign 
actors),  the number of like minded and connected groups has increased, the destruction of 
72 
 
bombing and suicide terrorism has increased (while the cost of bombing and suicide terrorism 
has decreased) it seems logical that new terrorism is characterised by an increase in violence. 
As previously discussed in the section on targets this is a matter of course and not something 
new. 
Also, as alluded to already, the increase in deaths and casualties in any time series however, 
is skewed by high impact, outlier events like 9/11 – an event which has skewed casualty and 
death statistics within the new terrorism time period. Also detracting from any correlation 
that this violence has with new terrorism is that fact that associated rises in bombings as well 
as casualties and deaths have also occurred throughout the period defined by old terrorism 
especially the 1980‟s and 1990‟s (when targeting of foreign targets was at its peak). Also, 
more efficient technologies, have contributed to more efficient bombs, therefore the rise in 
casualties is not a result of the type of terrorism (old or new) but rather the modernisation of 
weapons systems (Spencer, 2001:16). 
In conclusion, bombing as a tactic is used extensively throughout both time periods. Suicide 
terrorism was also a feature of old terrorism and was in fact pioneered by Hezbollah. 
Kidnapping, assassinations and hijackings while featuring prominently in the old terrorism 
period as tactics are still used in the new terrorism time period but less so. Bombing has been 
and will always be the tactic of choice due to its cost effectiveness and destructive capability. 
4.3 A Secondary Variable for Consideration: 
In analysing that data from the previous chapter a secondary variable has been discovered 
that can also be effectively used as a variable for comparison between old and new terrorism. 
This variable, structure, is regarded as important due to the attention it receives from a range 
of authors herein as well as the attention it receive as part of what is considered to constitute 
new terrorism. It is argued that new terrorism‟s group structure is novel because of its loosely 
defined network. This variable will now be discussed to assess whether or not it exposes any 
significant novelties within the concept of new terrorism when located within both old and 
new terrorism. 
4.3.1 Structure: 
Organisational structure has a number of implications with regards to how terrorist 
organisations are able to operate. Structure can affect the ability to achieve goals through the 
mechanisms of command and control. Similarly, organisational structure can also dictate the 
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constraints faced by the terrorist organisation and the degree to which it can operate 
transnationally.  
The organisational structure of the Brotherhood was hierarchical and domestically located. 
This structure is given to localised incidents of terror, especially within Egypt. Also, 
financing largely came from local sources and members. The reason for said structure is 
largely defined by organisational theory at the time which relied on top-down bureaucratic 
structures much like Weber‟s bureaucracy (Morgan, 1998:23). This bureaucratic structure 
dictates that goals are achieved through a fixed division of tasks, hierarchical supervision, 
and rules and regulations. The Brotherhood also achieved limited flexibility by decentralising 
some of its key functions to other bureaucratic branches within the Egyptian state – that is the 
“Special Apparatus” as well as local level municipal branches.  
This organisational structure and subsequently the effectiveness of the Brotherhood was 
undermined by the swift and decisive actions of government which, under Nasser, arrested 
some 20,000 members – not to mention the assassination of key Brotherhood figures like al-
Banna. These arrests and killings exposed the weakness of the organisational structure since 
the inherent form of the organisation as a bureaucratic apparatus has difficulty in adapting to 
change and can become paralysed by the loss of key personal (Morgan, 1998:32-33). 
The Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served as a watershed 
moment and catalyst for violence in the growth of terrorist groups in the period 1945-2000 by 
contributing to the structural change of terrorist organisations within the historical period. 
Groups that were hierarchical, bureaucratic and localised were now “inspired and assisted” in 
operating in an increasingly dispersed fashion. The organisation that is a case in point is 
Hezbollah.  
The organisational structure of Hezbollah, while similar to that of the Brotherhood, exhibits a 
new trend. This trend is the use of regionally and transnationally decentralised units of 
operation which make up its transnational organisational structure. This trend coincides with 
a number of key variables. Apart from the Iranian Revolution, a number of parallels can be 
drawn to the rise of the Multinational Corporation (MNC).This parallel can be made due to 
the similar time period in which MNC‟s have emerged as well as the structural similarities 
that MNC‟s have with organisations defined by the concept new terrorism – that is loose 
transnational networks. 
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In the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 century the world witnessed the growth and proliferation of MNCs 
along with developments in the capitalist world economy (Morgan, 1998:282). Coinciding 
with this globalisation was a change in the structure of the organisation to account for global 
influence, diversified resource bases and the reaction to government policy either enabling 
the MNC or not (Saul, 2009:1). This led to a change in the structure of business organisations 
from local bureaucracies to more adaptive and decentralised business organisations, examples 
include General Motors and Royal Dutch Shell. 
Coinciding with the rise of MNC‟s and globalisation is the second key factor – the Iranian 
Revolution (1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution further 
enabled and encouraged Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups to adopt a pattern of 
organisational decentralisation (transnationally) by becoming a global provider of weapons, 
funding and ideological support. 
It is thus that Hezbollah, under the influence of globalisation and other factors like the Iranian 
Revolution, adopted a structure similar to that of a globalising MNC. This structure is 
characterised, in the late 1980‟s and 1990‟s, by a pattern of centralised control with an 
increasingly broad-based pattern of ownership (Morgan, 1998:282). To this end Hezbollah 
draws resources from a broad-base of „investors‟(actors who have an interest in the groups 
success) and acts in its own centralised manner – that is from within the state of Lebanon.  
From the above, it is clear that old terrorism is both characterised by the centralised 
bureaucracy of the Brotherhood and the increasingly decentralised structure of Hezbollah.  
The structure of al-Qaeda defines new terrorism in a similar fashion. Al-Qaeda is described 
in chapter 3 as an organisation that has a both singular (bureaucratic) and networked 
(decentralised) capacity. Similarly to the Brotherhood and Hezbollah before it, the al-Qaeda 
network is symptomatic of a number of global influences. The first is globalisation and the 
creation of the MNC. Globalisation provides a number of technological accessories that aid a 
network configuration which is modelled on MNC development, both consciously and 
subconsciously by al-Qaeda leadership. In this respect al-Qaeda operates much like a large 
MNC – a central authority intervenes where necessary, but largely autonomous units are 
allowed, and encouraged, to operate on a global level. This allows for a greater degree of 
organisational flexibility, and encourages a strong simultaneous presence in a number of key 
areas around the world (Morgan, 1998:284).  
75 
 
The second factor contributing to this network structure is the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
in which Muslims from various states around the world came to Afghanistan to help dispel 
the foreign invaders. These fighters were largely state sponsored, and when the war was over 
they were given leave to return home. However, many of them retained the ideological 
teachings that they had attained from influential fighters like bin Laden and Azzam.  Upon 
returning to their home states these fighters now possessed a will to fight and an ideology to 
fight for; in some cases either starting their own Islamic fundamentalist groups or joining 
existing ones, subsequently growing the network. 
This organisational configuration is better suited to the asymmetrical power configuration 
that exists between states and terrorist organisations. The advantages of such a configuration 
are that al-Qaeda‟s attacks can be selectively carried out in any country around the world – 
especially where a country lacks the resources to effectively implement counter-terrorist 
policies and initiatives. Such a configuration also allows network affiliates the opportunity to 
draw from a larger, more diverse resource base. Thus capital, weapons and prospective group 
members are more easily located and attained – this insures organisational survival. Whether 
it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaysia or even Morocco al-Qaeda will always have a network 
affiliate from which to regroup and re-organise.
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The network structure for al-Qaeda, like modern MNCs, is shaped directly by a number of 
variables from within the rational choice framework. First, the network represents a response 
to various incentives; increased flexibility, increased chances of organisational survival, 
diverse access to resources, and, an increased chance of success. Secondly, if terrorists are 
considered self-interested, then group survival is a key variable, since the interests of the 
group are closely linked to terrorist group members. Networking increases survival. Also, 
rational expectations dictate that group members are more inclined to support a network 
structure since heavy handed bureaucracy is shown to undermine goal acquisition and place 
pressure on the organisational hierarchy (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood).  
Through a networked structure, al-Qaeda can now operate in areas with less security where 
the rational expectation of success is high and the associated costs are low. New terrorism‟s 
structure in this regard is not new but rather necessary, reactionary and rational. The rational 
choice framework effectively reduces the unexpected nature, and novelty, of the network 
structure by exposing the heuristic process that helped create and change terrorist 
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 For a list of known al-Qaeda affiliates in the post-2001 period see Appendix 1 Table 8. 
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organisations over time. In this regard the history of the terrorism helps to frame the present 
reality of terrorism, reducing the novelty therein. Thus new terrorism gains a great deal of its 
value from the processes and trends that help define old terrorism. 
Also, what must be noticed is the striking similarity between al-Qaeda‟s organisational 
structure and the structure of Hezbollah which also favoured higher degrees of 
decentralisation. Tucker (2001:3) also notes that the Marxist or left-wing revolutionary 
groups also became network-like as ideological diversity lead to greater structural 
complexity. An example is the Red Army Faction
51
 (RAF), which, despite the hierarchical 
connotation of the word „army‟, was not very hierarchical at all. The RAF spawned second 
and third generations haphazardly and remained more a collection of terrorists sharing a 
common purpose than a hierarchical organization. Hoffman (2001:426) also notes that over a 
century ago the anarchist movement referred to as Anarchist or Black International, active 
mainly in Russia and France, pursued a similar strategy to al-Qaeda. This strategy was 
characterised by violence carried out by loosely networked, largely unconnected cells of like-
minded radicals. 
Given the existence of loose network structures in old terrorist organisations like Hezbollah, 
the RAF and the Anarchist or Black International, the novelty of structure within new 
terrorism is debatable.  
4.4 The Value of New Terrorism as a Variable in Political Risk Analysis: 
As can be noted from the above analysis new terrorism as a single conceptual entity has little 
novelty or value as a concept in PRA. This is largely because new terrorism takes a snap shot 
of contemporary trends in terrorism. Secondly, the concept of new terrorism fails to address 
the historical periods in which similar trends have occurred. The lack of novelty in the 
concept new terrorism combined with its narrow focus undermines its value within PRA by 
creating too narrow a focus for analysis and subsequent mitigation. Therefore new terrorism 
as a concept for analysis does not contribute to mitigating the political risk of terrorism; 
instead it constrains the forecasting and heuristic process through which PRA rationally 
operates. 
                                                 
51
 RAF, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, is a group of German origin that came into existence during 
the late 1960s in opposition to German capitalism, and was responsible for a number of high profile bombings, 
assassinations and kidnappings (Baader-Meinhof, 2010). 
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Analysed by itself the strict focus of new terrorism guides PRA towards the forecasting of 
unknown consequences (risk) from a pool of information that is constrained by its very 
definition. In this regard, primacy is given to loose networks, over structured ones; 
transnational groups, over national ones; macro risks, over micro risks; high casualty 
incidents, over low casualty incidents; and religious motivations, over political ones. To this 
end as a concept new terrorism constricts the field of analysis of political risk. This stands in 
contrast to what PRA strives to achieve, that is the “entire scope of uncertainty posed by the 
political environment” (Frei and Ruloff, 1988:2) – or in this case the entire scope of 
uncertainty posed by the political risk of terrorism.  
The rational choice framework while guiding terrorism trends internally also guides the 
analytical process in PRA. In the rational choice framework this process is heuristics, while 
in PRA this is called forecasting. Forecasting, like heuristics, is the process through which 
new experiences are related to past experiences, whilst maintaining the uniqueness of the new 
experience. New terrorism might not be a novelty however it does capture unique trends in 
the 21
st
 century. Accordingly, as per the rational framework that is used within PRA, for a 
variable or concept to offer significant insight into the risk environment it needs to be able to 
“use the results of memory as a proxy for the projection of future probability” (March, 1994: 
13).  
Unfortunately, the limited capacity of what the new terrorism concept considers to be new, as 
well as the way in which the new terrorism concept places primacy over certain trends and 
not others, prevents it from having any deep analytical character or memory from which PRA 
can draw from. This further undermines the value of new terrorism. In the following section a 
normative concept of terrorism will be constructed using the insights gained from both old 
and new terrorism. The purpose of this normative concept of terrorism is to create an 
analytical concept within PRA that serves the rational choice process of forecasting and 
heuristics and therefore better serves the mitigation of terrorism as a political risk. New 
terrorism has its most value when considered in conjunction with old terrorism rather than in 
a single capacity. To this end a normative concept of terrorism must consider both past events 
and the uniqueness of the present. 
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4.5 Derived Indicators of a Normative Concept  of Terrorism: 
Given that the novelty of new terrorism can be called into question this section addresses the 
manner in which old and new terrorism should make up a normative concept of terrorism for 
application within PRA. 
The most valued insight that the previous discussion has offered is that terrorism as a concept 
must analyse a number of key variables rationally, that is using the memory of past events to 
project future outcomes. That said terrorist groups do not operate in a vacuum – they both 
shape, and are shaped by, the environment in which they operate. Accordingly, when 
constructing a terrorism concept, its primary focus must express the macro and micro risk 
environment. Secondly, the ever increasing transnational character of terrorism, must not 
discount the domestic character of terrorism – both spheres must be considered.  
From the method of analysis herein three primary variables for analysis are already apparent: 
goals, targets and tactics. A secondary variable for analysis is structure.  
As already demonstrated through the analysis in chapter 3, these variables are easily 
applicable to the concept of terrorism in both an old and new terrorism context.  This is 
important as the most value is gained by considering terrorism historically as well as in a 
more contemporary setting. A normative concept of terrorism must therefore express both its 
historical and contemporary character; in doing so terrorism has a past memory, as well as a 
contemporary understanding, with a possibility to project future outcomes. 
The construction of the matrix represented in Table 6 is based on the conclusions from the 
variable analysis herein and serves as a representation of a normative concept of terrorism. 
The power of terrorism as a concept for analysis in PRA is found through the heuristic and 
forecasting processes. These processes combine the old and the new conceptions of terrorism 
so as to provide a more holistic picture from which PRA may develop better suited mitigation 
strategies. Old or new terrorism cannot serve to meet these ends in their respective singular 
capacities. 
Table 6 provides an outline as to how a normative understanding of the terrorism concept can 
be applied though a simple matrix. It must be stressed that this matrix is not a table in which 
information is an input, rather it serves as a check list. This check list serves to provide the 
user with a representation of that which must be considered in constructing a normative 
conceptualisation of terrorism for analysis within PRA.  
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Table 6: Normative Terrorism Matrix: 
 Domestic 
(Terrorist Group) 
Transnational 
(Terrorist Group) 
Micro Risk Macro Risk Micro Risk Macro Risk 
Historical 
Trend 
Contemporary 
Trend 
Historical 
Trend 
Contemporary 
Trend 
Historical 
Trend 
Contemporary 
Trend 
Historical 
Trend 
Contemporary 
Trend 
Goals         
Targets         
Tactics         
Structure         
 
From the analysis conducted through the course of this research study it has been discovered 
that new terrorism is not a novelty, however, it is recognised that new terrorism as a static 
concept provides a snap shot of contemporary trends in terrorism. These trends however, only 
have value when compared to past terrorist trends which is captured by the concept of old 
terrorism. This finding combined with the rational choice framework and PRA is further 
illustrated through the heuristic process and forecasting respectively. These processes 
combine the concepts of old and new terrorism to form a normative concept of terrorism.  
On a normative level to illustrate these rational processes new terrorism and old terrorism 
have to be captured simultaneously. For this purpose the categories Historical Trend and 
Contemporary Trend capture the dynamism of a normative terrorism concept. To add further 
conceptual weight it is also vital to assess whether or not the nature of terrorism is domestic 
or transnational, or whether the threat that terrorism poses is at a micro or macro level. This is 
a holistic approach to terrorism not represented by either of the previous concepts when 
considered in a singular capacity. 
From the analysis herein a normative variable of terrorism must include a descriptive analysis 
of the key variables discussed at the starting point of this study – goals, targets and tactics. It 
has been illustrated throughout that they provide adequate description of terrorism in both 
time periods. Contributing to these variables structure is also added since this variable 
measures the degree to which terrorism has an influence on a domestic or transnational level. 
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It also illustrates the degree to which the terrorist group is interlinked with other groups or 
not. This has implications for the risk that terrorism poses as well as the strategies of 
mitigation that need to be adopted. 
To utilise this table first, the question is asked, what group/s have an effect at a domestic or 
transnational level (or both). After the group is identified the terrorist group is assessed to 
determine whether it determines its targets selectively or whether it targets indiscriminately; 
at a micro level or macro level respectively. Then the terrorist group is assessed to determine 
its goals, targets, tactics and structure both as a historical trend as well as how they are 
perceived as a contemporary trend.  
This matrix can be applied to all terrorist groups active in the environment in which a PRA 
seeks to mitigate risk. This type of analysis does not rely on a singular conception of 
terrorism to guide it, or on a variable that is static in its analysis. Instead the value of this type 
of analysis, and this normative understanding of terrorism, is its ability to locate a trend and 
make subsequent forecasts based on both a historical and contemporary account of the key 
variables that constitute a terrorist group – the goals, targets, tactics and structure. This 
fulfils a key objective of PRA through the use of the rational choice framework. 
4.6 Conclusion: 
The data herein illustrates a number of key findings about old and new terrorism. Through an 
individual analysis of the goals, targets, and tactics as the primary variables assessing 
terrorism it was illustrated that both time periods exhibit similar traits, and that no novelties 
occur.  
Adding to the existing variables of analysis was the secondary variable of structure. Similarly 
to the above it was illustrated that in spite of subtle differences similar traits have occurred in 
both time periods – this again shows that the novelty of new terrorism is unfounded.  
What is illustrated by new terrorism however, is a contemporary trend in terrorism in a 
certain time period. It is herein that the real value of new terrorism is located. The real value 
of new terrorism as applied to PRA is gained when it has a memory from which to be 
compared. In this regard the value of new terrorism is dependent on an analysis of old 
terrorism. This type of analysis is based on the heuristic process from the rational choice 
framework as well as the forecasting process from within PRA. To this end, Table 6 offers a 
basis for the construction of a normative concept of terrorism. This table encourages its user 
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to capture both historical and contemporary trends in terrorism based on the discussed 
variables herein.  
In conclusion, the value of new terrorism does not come from its novelty, but rather from its 
comparison and inclusion of old terrorism. In this regard, a normative historical-
contemporary terrorism concept is better suited to the rational choice framework and PRA in 
general.
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Chapter 5: Summary of Main Findings and Concluding Remarks 
5.1 Introduction: 
This research study began by focusing on the novelty and value of new terrorism as a concept 
for analysis within PRA. This focus led to the construction of the implied concept of old 
terrorism, as well as the establishment of two clear time periods for analysis. These time 
periods were 1945-2000 for old terrorism, and 2001-2009 for new terrorism. These time 
periods were compared on the bases of three primary variables goals, targets and tactics, as 
well as a discovered secondary variable structure. 
The central research question of this research study was concerned with the value of the 
concept of new terrorism within PRA. Accordingly this research study set about establishing 
this value through a historical comparison of the two time periods and concepts mentioned 
above. Also considered was the role of the rational choice framework as well as this 
frameworks contribution to the understanding of terrorism as a concept for analysis within 
PRA.  
This chapter highlights the key findings as they relate to what this research paper initially set 
out to do. What follows is a discussion on the Course of the Research Study, an Evaluation of 
the Research Study, a Summary of Contributions, as well as, Suggestions for Further 
Research.  
5.2 Course of the Research Study: 
The main findings within this research study are guided by a number of variables as they 
relate to both old and new terrorism. The initial variables for discussion were goals, targets 
and tactics. Through systematic analysis of three Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups in 
two distinct time periods a number of conclusions were drawn about each variable. The 
Islamic fundamentalist groups discussed in the period 1945-2000 were the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Hezbollah.  
Through the analysis of the given variables for each group it was illustrated that they shared 
two primary goals. These goals were 1) the establishment of Islamic law within the state, and 
2) the removal of foreign influence.  
Based on the goals of these two groups, as well as further analysis, the Brotherhood and 
Hezbollah also shared two broadly characterised targets. These targets were 1) government 
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officials and, 2) foreign actors. However, Hezbollah sought to act against targets in a 
regional/transnational capacity. It therefore pursued both local targets as well as targets 
across the state boundary from which the group originates. 
The tactics that each group used differ slightly based on one primary factor – the Iranian 
Revolution. As discussed herein it was as a result of the Iranian Revolution that Hezbollah, 
(among other terrorist groups) garnered better weapons as well as inspiration. Essentially, the 
Iranian Revolution “inspired and assisted” Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the latter part 
of the time period 1945-2000, especially during the 1980s. 
The tactics employed by the Brotherhood were protest, assassination, kidnapping and 
bombing - with primacy given to more resource heavy and selective methods of attack. 
Alternatively, Hezbollah – whilst engaging in similar tactics to the Brotherhood were more 
prone to violence and methods of violence that were achievable through little use of resources 
– these include bombing and suicide terrorism. Data given by Enders and Sandler (2006:59) 
note that for the period 1968-2003 bombing incidents (4,003) made up a quarter of the total 
incidents (12,559), with kidnapping (1,186) and assassination (1,078) also featuring 
prominently. 
For the period 2001-2009 the Islamic fundamentalist group al-Qaeda was discussed in terms 
of its goals, targets and tactics. Herein it was discovered that similarly to Hezbollah and the 
Brotherhood before it al-Qaeda also pursues two primary goals, albeit with a different focus. 
These two goals are first and foremost, the removal of foreign influence, and secondly, the 
establishment of Islamic law within the state. The altered focus of the group towards foreign 
influence first and the establishment of the Islamic state as a secondary goal emanates from 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which shaped the ideologies of al-Qaeda‟s two main 
ideologues – Azzam and bin Laden. 
Accordingly the targets that al-Qaeda pursues are equally similar to the preceding groups. 
These targets are: 1) foreign actors and 2) local government. Similarly to Hezbollah al-Qaeda 
also pursues its targets transnationally – it is therefore not contained by any one state. 
Finally, the tactics of al-Qaeda were discussed where it was discovered that al-Qaeda favours 
bombing and suicide terrorism. This is not to say however that kidnapping and assassination 
are not employed, these tactics are rather not favoured or employed as rigorously. The tactics 
of bombing and suicide terrorism are reflective of the subtle goal change towards foreign 
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influence. These tactics can be used to inflict maximum damage and a broad range of foreign 
targets. 
Contributing to the variable analysis herein is the addition of a secondary variable for 
comparison. This variable was structure. Structurally, it was illustrated that the Brotherhood 
had a centralised bureaucratic structure; however, as the first time period progressed the 
structure of Islamic fundamentalist groups became increasingly decentralised and flexible; 
this is reflective of Hezbollah‟s group structure. Explanations for this are attributed to the 
Iranian revolution, as well as the rise of the MNC and globalisation. This is similar to the 
group structure of al-Qaeda which is also decentralised. However, al-Qaeda has taken it a 
further degree than Hezbollah by becoming a decentralised networked of affiliated groups 
that share similar goals, targets and tactics. The group structure of al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
therefore appears to be both simultaneously bureaucratic and decentralised. It is debatable 
however that this is novel. When considering al-Qaeda and its affiliates in isolation of one 
another their group structures would merely reflect the structures of the Brotherhood and 
Hezbollah, from the previous time period – that is al-Qaeda is largely decentralised and 
transnational, with its affiliates mostly being bureaucratic and domestically located. 
As this relates back to PRA it can be concluded that new terrorism has little value as a 
singular concept for analysis and may in fact constrain the analytical processes within PRA 
and subsequently the mitigation of terrorism as a risk in PRA. 
5.3 Evaluation of Research Study: 
To establish a definitive conclusion to the main research question herein the sub-questions 
will be considered first. These sub-questions served to broadly outline the main differences 
and similarities between old and new terrorism. The sub-questions also served to illuminate 
the role of the rational choice framework within PRA. The first sub-question for 
consideration asked: 
What is the old versus the new conceptualisation of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism? 
Based on the above findings, old terrorism is focused towards the establishment of the 
Islamic state, under Islamic law, as well as the removal of foreign influence. To this end old 
terrorism seeks to target local government officials and foreign actors through the use of 
violent means. Violent tactics employed during the period defined by old terrorism include, 
kidnapping, assassination, bombing and suicide terrorism all of which inflict varying degrees 
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of casualties. Also the main perpetrators of these violent acts are terrorist groups that are both 
structurally bureaucratic as well as structurally decentralised, that operated both domestically 
and increasingly transnationally. 
New terrorism, as is conceptualised through an analysis of al-Qaeda in the period 2001-2009 
is characterised as follows. New terrorism is focused towards the removal of foreign 
influence so as to establish the Islamic state under Islamic law. To this end new terrorism 
seeks to target both local government officials and foreign actors through two primary tactics, 
notably suicide terrorism and bombing. These tactics are extremely violent and generally 
inflict high number casualties. This contributes to a trend of increased violence. Also the 
main perpetrators of these acts are increasingly decentralised and transnational. However, 
when considering al-Qaeda and its affiliates as separate entities, the group structures are 
bureaucratic and decentralised, as well as domestic and transnational. 
The two conceptualisations of old and new terrorism respectively illustrate that new terrorism 
is not as novel as first thought. It is certainly not novel enough to justify its label. There are a 
number of striking generalisations that can be made in both time periods. These 
generalisations come in the shared characteristics of the variables, goals, targets, tactics, and 
structure. 
The remaining sub-questions can be addressed in a similar fashion. These sub-questions 
asked: 
 How does rational choice theory reconcile the differences between old and 
new terrorism?  
 How does rational choice theory contribute to understanding terrorism as a 
PRA variable?  
In discussing the first sub-question posed above, it is important to note that old and new 
terrorism share more similarities than differences. To this end rational choice theory, and the 
rational choice framework is not very applicable when it comes to reconciling differences. 
Where the rational choice framework is applicable is in the comprehension of terrorism as 
something that responds to various historical incentives that alter its general characterises 
over time regardless of whether these characteristics are new or being repeated – herein lies 
the value of the rational choice framework and terrorism as a variable in PRA. 
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Rational choice theory contributes to the understanding of terrorism by illustrating the 
importance of both old and new terrorism as necessary considerations when assessing risk. 
Through the use of rational choice, the importance of understanding past events is highlighted 
through the heuristic process. This process combines old and new terrorism creating a more 
holistic understanding of terrorism within PRA. From this point of view terrorism is not 
considered as a single snapshot in time but rather a continual process. The value of terrorism 
as a variable in PRA is in understanding terrorism as a dynamic variable that subtly shifts 
over time without necessarily being novel. It locates trends where certain goals, targets, 
tactics and structure are being repeated and assesses to what degree these trends are being 
repeated.   
For example, the Muslim Brotherhood did not use suicide terrorism as a tactic but Hezbollah 
did. Regardless of this difference that fact the Hezbollah used this tactic within the old 
terrorism negates the novelty of suicide terrorism in the new terrorism period. By just 
focusing on new terrorism this would not be seen as important. However, using rational 
choice, the environmental incentives (Iranian Revolution, Soviet Invasion, and war on terror) 
for this shift can be discussed both historically and in a contemporary setting to make 
inferences as to why suicide terrorism is presently so prevalent as well as forecast future 
probabilities as to how suicide terrorism may be used in the future. This method, using the 
rational choice framework, may be similarly applied to other goals, targets, tactics and 
structure of terrorism. What is important to note herein is that the significance of new 
terrorism can only be located through a rational process that considers the memory of old 
terrorism. Should either concept stand alone the rational framework for analysis within PRA 
is undermined, and subsequently the ability for PRA to effectively mitigate terrorism is also 
undermined.  
These sub-questions can now be analysed together in order to answer the over arching 
research question which asks:  
Are the changes in Islamic fundamentalism (from 1945-2000 and 2001-2009) significant 
enough for the variable “new terrorism” to have real value within PRA? 
The simple answer is no, the changes in Islamic fundamentalism are not significant enough 
for the concept new terrorism to have real value within PRA. Instead the value of a terrorism 
concept in PRA must come from a combined rational understanding of both old and new 
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terrorism. This rational understanding seeks to unpack the various incentives motivating 
terrorist goals, targets, tactics and structure. Furthermore by adding conceptual weight to 
both time periods, the memory of past events, combined with the uniqueness of the present 
can be used to make a rational forecast as to how terrorism will be in the future. Rational 
choice advocates a more holistic approach to terrorism and the trends that guide it in both a 
historical and a contemporary setting. This finding is illustrated in Table 6 which provides a 
checklist for consideration when establishing a concept of terrorism for analysis within PRA. 
This normative concept allows for a greater depth of analysis and subsequently the possibility 
for more effective mitigation.  
5.4 Summary of Contributions: 
Hough (2005), as well as Spencer (2006), highlight the importance of new terrorism since the 
concept argues that terrorists operate transnationally in loosely organised networks, they are 
motivated by religious extremism, they aim at mass casualties and target indiscriminate 
victims. 
What has been illustrated through the above research is that this is indeed the case for 
contemporary terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. However, the novelty of this is questionable. It 
is illustrated herein that terrorist groups, both old and new share a number of similarities, and 
that these groups are more alike than they are different. Terrorist groups from both periods 
share similarities in goals, targets, tactics and structure. These findings undermine the 
novelty of the claims made by authors who support the concept of new terrorism. 
The practical implications of this are realised through the use of the rational choice 
framework as it relates to PRA. The rational choice framework advocates that PRA must 
consider terrorism in both a historical as well as a contemporary setting to get full value for 
its analysis. In this regard, PRA cannot find value in the exclusive use of new terrorism as a 
variable in PRA. When PRA uses both the historical and the contemporary understanding of 
terrorism it is better able to forecast possible future trends by having a more holistic 
conceptual understanding of terrorism - regardless of whether these trends are novel or being 
repeated. This understanding provides a holistic approach to terrorism and forms the basis of 
a normative terrorism variable in PRA. This variable, rather than placing primacy on certain 
conceptual characteristics, seeks to unpack why these characteristics are prevalent and 
forecast what these characteristic are likely to be in the future. 
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This research therefore has not reinvented the terrorism concept or variable, it merely states 
the fact that PRA cannot be too hasty in its adoption of a static conceptualisation of terrorism 
to the detriment of a more holistic and historical analysis. Too narrow a focus has the real 
potential to undermine the total mitigation of terrorism as a political risk. 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Research: 
For further contributions to be made to the debate on the novelty of new terrorism future 
research could be conducted using a range of other terrorist organisations. The more 
organisations that are used, using the methods outlined herein, the more valid the findings. 
Similarly, the applicability of the findings herein to other identities of terrorism would make 
for an interesting comparison. In this regard terrorism in the service of national liberation 
and ethnic separatism, as well as left-wing terrorism could be explored as further avenues of 
comparison. 
With regards to PRA, future research would do well to help establish a more concrete and 
consensual variable of terrorism. At present there are over 100 alternative definitions of 
terrorism which, rather than adding clarity to the concept or variable, draw away from the 
effectiveness of PRA to produce reliable and consistent results. The concept of new terrorism 
is a case in point since, from the research herein; it merely serves to overstate the novelty of 
contemporary terrorist activity to the detriment of a more holistic understanding of the trends 
associated with the development of terrorism as a tactic governed by rational actors who 
respond to various environmental incentives. 
Another avenue of research within PRA is the role that political stability plays in terms of the 
risks that terrorism poses. Does high political stability mean less risk of terrorism? 
Subsequently, what is the relationship between democracy and terrorism? This was 
tentatively alluded to in chapter 2, but would make for very informative future research. 
A final suggestion for further research could be on the effects that the concept of new 
terrorism has on the nature of counterterrorism policy. As the “war on terror” rages on 
through the 21
st
 century with little intention to halt, how has new terrorism shaped discourse 
on the war and on the policies that drive the war both domestically and in the theatre of 
combat? Has the significance of new terrorism been overstated since 9/11 and is the “war on 
terror” really that – a war on terror? Or is the “war on terror” really a war against Islam, or 
war for resource control?  
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5.6 Conclusion:  
This sub-section ends this research study which has been a historical comparison of old and 
new terrorism. Through the analysis of the primary and secondary variables herein it has 
been established that there are more similarities than differences between old and new 
terrorism.  The value of new terrorism as a concept for analysis within PRA is thus extremely 
limited.  For PRA to be successful in its objectives of risk assessment and mitigation it 
requires a concept of terrorism that is not limited in its conceptual capacity. Too narrow a 
focus has real potential to undermine the total mitigation of terrorism as a political risk. To 
this end PRA requires a holistic terrorism concept for analysis. This normative terrorism 
concept must reflect both old and new terrorism simultaneously. It is through this holistic and 
rational understanding of terrorism as a concept for analysis that the greatest value can be 
attained from analysis and strides can be made towards the mitigation of the risk that 
terrorism poses.  
Regardless of the findings herein however, terrorism will always have elements that will be 
wholly unknown and unpredictable. So long as the dominant world order (the West) 
characterises the actions of terrorists as problems to be solved, or confined, or taken over 
there will always be groups of reactionaries ready to make a stand for their culture, their 
religion, or their politics. Terrorism at its heart is a grievance. For terrorism to be effectively 
combated it must be understood as a human condition with a human face. Similarly terrorists 
must be considered people, albeit more desperate than your average person, they nevertheless 
seek similar ideals – to have a place in this world free from a relationship of domination and 
subordination. As a closing comment on the “war on terror” as a form of mitigation, future 
mitigation tactics should not involve such extreme uses of force or counter-violence; instead 
mitigation should consider the real grievances at the heart of the terrorist organisation. As 
Edmund Burke is quoted in a Speech on Conciliation with America (1775) “the use of force 
alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of 
subduing again.”  
90 
 
Appendix 1 
Table 7: al-Qaeda Affiliates 1990-2000 
Groups affiliated to al-Qaeda between 1990  and 2000 
Group  Country of Activity 
Jihad Movement of Bangladesh Bangladesh 
Al-Jihad Egypt 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan Pakistan 
Armed Islamic Group Algeria 
Salafist Group for Call and Combat Algeria 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Uzbekistan 
Jemaah Islamiyah  Indonesia 
Harakat ul-Mujahedin Pakistan (Kashmir) 
Jaish-e-Mohammad Pakistan (Kashmir) 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Pakistan (Kashmir) 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Pakistan (Kashmir) 
Asbat al-Ansar  Lebanon 
Al Qaeda Jihad Organisation Jordan 
Islamic Army of Aden Yemen 
Hizb-e-Islam/Gulbuddin Yemen 
Moroccan Islamic Combat Group Morocco 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula Saudi Arabia 
The Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe England/Egypt 
(Castells, 2004; Katzman, 2005) 
Table 8: al-Qaeda Affiliates post-2001 
Groups affiliated to al-Qaeda post-2001 
Group  Country of Activity 
Egyptain Islamic Jihad Egypt 
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group  Lybia 
Islamic Army of Aden Yemen 
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad Iraq 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Kashmir 
Jaish-e-Muhammed Kashmir 
Islmaic Movement of Uzbekistan Uzbekistan 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (aka Salafist 
Group for Call and Combat) Algeria 
Armed Islamic Group Algeria 
Abu Sayyaf Group Malaysia, Philippines 
Jemaah Islamiya Southeast Asia 
(CFR, 2009) 
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